United States v. Maurice Davis
903 F.3d 483
| 5th Cir. | 2018Background
- Defendants Andre Levon Glover and Maurice Lamont Davis were convicted on multiple counts including Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951) and using/carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)).
- On initial appeal the Fifth Circuit affirmed convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded for reconsideration in light of Sessions v. Dimaya.
- The key statutory question: whether Hobbs Act robbery and a conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery qualify as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)’s elements clause or residual clause.
- The government conceded that conspiracy (Count Two) could only be sustained under § 924(c)’s residual clause; Hobbs Act robbery as a predicate for Count Seven was defended under the elements clause.
- The panel (majority) held § 924(c)(3)(B) — the residual clause — is unconstitutionally vague under Dimaya and vacated convictions/sentences on Count Two, but affirmed § 924(c) convictions predicated on Hobbs Act robbery under the elements clause.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hobbs Act robbery is a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A) (elements clause) | Government: Hobbs Act robbery has as an element the use/threat/attempted use of physical force and so qualifies | Defendants: Hobbs Act robbery can be committed by inducing "fear of injury" without physical force, so it may not meet the elements clause | Affirmed: Hobbs Act robbery qualifies under the elements clause per existing Fifth Circuit precedent (Buck) |
| Whether conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery is a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3) | Government initially contended categorical approach applies; later sought a case-specific conduct-based approach | Defendants: Conspiracy does not require use/attempt/threat of physical force; only the residual clause could reach it | Held: Conspiracy conviction (Count Two) relied on § 924(c)'s residual clause, which the court found unconstitutionally vague under Dimaya — conviction vacated |
| Whether § 924(c)(3)(B) (residual clause) is constitutional after Dimaya | Government urged adoption of a case-specific residual analysis to avoid vagueness | Defendants argued residual clause is void for vagueness per Dimaya | Held: § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague under Dimaya when applied via the categorical approach; court declined to adopt a case-specific approach and vacated Count Two |
| Appropriate remedy when a § 924(c) predicate is invalidated | Government: excise affected conviction only; leave remainder of sentencing package intact | Defendants: full resentencing necessary because sentences are a package and excision may frustrate sentencing intent (concurring/dissent) | Held: Majority vacated Count Two and remanded for revised judgment but left the remaining aggregate sentences intact; one judge would have vacated entire sentences and remanded for resentencing |
Key Cases Cited
- Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (invalidating a residual clause as unconstitutionally vague and emphasizing ordinary-case and risk-threshold problems)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidating ACCA residual clause for vagueness)
- United States v. Buck, 847 F.3d 267 (5th Cir. 2017) (holding Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A))
- United States v. Williams, 343 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2003) (describing the categorical approach for applying § 924(c)(3)(B))
- United States v. Gore, 636 F.3d 728 (5th Cir. 2011) (explaining conspiracy is an agreement and may not require use of force)
- United States v. Clark, 816 F.3d 350 (5th Cir. 2016) (discussing effect of excising a conviction on remaining aggregate sentence)
- Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011) (describing a criminal sentence as a sentencing "package")