United States v. Martinez
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 15173
1st Cir.2014Background
- After a gang-related double-homicide wake, Framingham police monitored the area for violence; Officer Lewis stopped a silver car that sped away and ran a red light.
- Lewis recognized passenger Raymond Martinez as a Bloods member with prior weapons/assault charges; the driver identified himself as a known Bloods member and was arrested after officers smelled marijuana.
- During the stop Martinez repeatedly moved his hands toward his waistband despite orders to keep hands visible and placed a 12‑second phone call from the car; officers did not conclusively see a phone.
- Sergeant Esposito removed Martinez, ordered him to place his hands on the car, asked about weapons, and conducted a frisk; she felt a hard object in his waistband and recovered a loaded firearm.
- Martinez was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); he conditionally pled guilty after the district court denied his suppression motion. At sentencing the court applied a six‑level enhancement, treating a prior Massachusetts assault and battery conviction as a "crime of violence," producing a 70‑month sentence.
- On appeal the First Circuit affirmed denial of the suppression motion (Terry analysis) but vacated the sentence, holding the government failed to show the prior convictions necessarily qualified as crimes of violence under the Guidelines.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Martinez) | Defendant's Argument (Gov't) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was the frisk/search supported by reasonable suspicion under Terry? | Officers misperceived Martinez's movements; no particularized suspicion that he was armed and dangerous. | Officers reasonably suspected Martinez was armed given gang context, flight, recognition as gang member with weapons history, and repeated reaching toward waistband. | Affirmed: facts (high‑risk context, flight, gang affiliation, repeated reaches) gave reasonable suspicion to frisk. |
| Did the district court clearly err in crediting officers' testimony that Martinez reached for a gun? | Court erred in credibility findings. | Court properly credited officer testimony; evidence supported that belief. | No clear error: court's credibility findings upheld. |
| Does Martinez's 2010 Massachusetts assault & battery conviction qualify as a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)? | The plea allocution (admission of "struck") does not necessarily admit intentional, violent force; Massachusetts statute covers offensive or reckless touching that may not be violent. | The allocution shows he admitted "striking" the victim (harmful battery), which qualifies as violent, intentional conduct. | Reversed: government failed to show the conviction necessarily involved intentional, violent force; cannot treat it as a crime of violence. |
| Does a separate Massachusetts simple assault conviction qualify as a "crime of violence"? | (Implicit) Simple assault may not require violent force. | Simple assault requires attempted/threatened use of physical (violent) force and thus qualifies. | Rejected: Massachusetts law still allows mere offensive touching/attempts that may not be violent; statute does not categorically meet Guideline's "violent force" requirement. |
Key Cases Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (establishing the stop‑and‑frisk standard for officer safety)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (limits documents a sentencing court may consult to identify the offense of conviction)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (adopting the categorical approach for comparing prior convictions to federal offense definitions)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 ("physical force" means violent force capable of causing pain or injury)
- United States v. McGregor, 650 F.3d 813 (1st Cir.) (pat‑frisk upheld where gang context, flight, and nervousness supported reasonable suspicion)
- United States v. Monteiro, 447 F.3d 39 (1st Cir.) (seizure impermissible where suspicion rested on minimally corroborated tip)
- United States v. McKoy, 428 F.3d 38 (1st Cir.) (suppression required where suspicion rested solely on nervousness and area danger)
- United States v. Holloway, 630 F.3d 252 (1st Cir.) (discussing Massachusetts assault/battery variants and Guideline analysis)