United States v. Markell Dixon, 27 F.4th 568

Defendant Markell Dixon pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm; district court increased his base offense level under U.S.S.G. §2K2.1(a)(4)(A) based on a prior Iowa conviction for intimidation with a dangerous weapon (Iowa Code §708.6(1)).
Dixon’s Iowa conviction arose from shooting at a vehicle with multiple occupants and allegedly placing them in fear; the Iowa charging document described firing at fleeing occupants.
The district court applied the categorical approach, overruled Dixon’s objection, concluded the Iowa offense was a "crime of violence," computed a Guidelines range of 84–105 months, and sentenced Dixon to 96 months.
On appeal the central legal question was whether §708.6(1) is categorically a crime of violence under the Guidelines, which define that term as having as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another (U.S.S.G. §4B1.2(a)(1)).
The Seventh Circuit applied the categorical approach, relied on the Iowa Supreme Court’s reading of §708.6(1) (requiring placing victims in "reasonable apprehension of serious injury"), and concluded that this element necessarily entails a threatened use of physical force.
Because the Iowa statute’s minimum conduct is congruent with the Guidelines’ definition of "crime of violence," the court affirmed the sentencing enhancement and Dixon’s sentence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Iowa §708.6(1) is categorically a "crime of violence" under the Sentencing Guidelines	Dixon: statute can criminalize use of force against property or unoccupied property and thus is broader than the Guidelines' person‑directed "physical force" requirement	Government: §708.6(1) requires placing persons in reasonable apprehension of serious injury, which necessarily involves threatened use of physical force and so matches the Guidelines	Court: Affirmed. §708.6(1)’s apprehension-of-serious-injury element equates to threatened use of physical force; conviction is a crime of violence

United States v. Vesey, 966 F.3d 694 (7th Cir.) (describing categorical approach under Guidelines)
United States v. Taylor, 630 F.3d 629 (7th Cir.) (noting categorical method applies under Guidelines and ACCA)
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (categorical-approach framework for prior-conviction enhancements)
Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (defining "physical force" as violent force or force capable of causing injury)
United States v. Smith, 981 F.3d 606 (7th Cir.) (applying categorical approach to an Iowa aggravated-assault conviction)
Bridges v. United States, 991 F.3d 793 (7th Cir.) (statute broader than Guidelines where it covers fear of injury to persons or property)
United States v. Langston, 772 F.3d 560 (8th Cir.) (holding Iowa §708.6 equivalent to threatening physical force)
United States v. Armour, 840 F.3d 904 (7th Cir.) (robbery places victims in reasonable fear of bodily injury, implying threatened force)