United States v. Mario Thomas
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 17459
| 8th Cir. | 2016Background
- Defendant Mario Thomas convicted of distributing cocaine base; at sentencing the district court applied the U.S.S.G. career-offender enhancement based on two prior felonies, including Arkansas first-degree battery (Ark. Code § 5-13-201(a)(1)).
- § 5-13-201(a)(1) criminalizes causing "serious physical injury" "by means of a deadly weapon." Arkansas defines "serious physical injury" and "deadly weapon" in §§ 5-1-102(21), (4).
- Eighth Circuit precedent (Boose) held § 5-13-201 covers broader conduct than the Guidelines "force clause," so the district court used the modified categorical approach to identify the subsection of conviction.
- The charging information tracked subsection (a)(1) language (alleging causing serious injury by means of a deadly weapon); the district court found the information established by a preponderance that Thomas pled guilty to (a)(1).
- Thomas argued on appeal that (1) the charging document didn’t establish conviction under (a)(1), and (2) (a)(1) does not require the use of violent force as defined by Johnson, so it is not a Guidelines "crime of violence." The district court applied the enhancement and sentenced Thomas to 188 months; the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the charging document establishes conviction under § 5-13-201(a)(1) | Thomas: charging document does not specify subsection, so (a)(1) not proven | Government: information tracks (a)(1) language (unique use of "deadly weapon") and docket shows no amendment | Court: charging document, plea, and docket reasonably infer conviction under (a)(1) |
| Whether § 5-13-201(a)(1) requires the use of "violent force" | Thomas: (a)(1) can be violated without actual, attempted, or threatened violent force | Government: (a)(1) requires causing "serious physical injury" by means of a "deadly weapon," which necessarily involves physical force | Court: Causing serious physical injury by a deadly weapon necessarily involves physical (violent) force and meets Johnson's "violent force" definition |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Boose, 739 F.3d 1185 (8th Cir. 2014) (interpreting Arkansas first-degree battery in relation to the Guidelines force clause)
- United States v. Pierson, 544 F.3d 933 (8th Cir. 2008) (standard of review for sentence enhancement based on prior conviction)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (categorical approach to prior-offense elements)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (definition of "violent force" for prior-offense analysis)
- United States v. Ossana, 638 F.3d 895 (8th Cir. 2011) (modified categorical approach and permissible Shepard documents)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (authorized records for determining the statutory clause of conviction)
- United States v. Rice, 813 F.3d 704 (8th Cir. 2016) (Arkansas battery offense meets Guidelines force-clause under similar reasoning)
- United States v. Vinton, 631 F.3d 476 (8th Cir. 2011) (charging instrument tracking subsection language can establish the specific statutory subdivision)