United States v. Marcus Watson
881 F.3d 782
9th Cir.2018Background
- Marcus Watson and Rogussia Danielson robbed an American Savings Bank while armed and were charged under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)/(d) (armed bank robbery) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (using/carrying a firearm during a crime of violence).
- Both pleaded guilty to the robbery and § 924(c) counts and received lengthy prison sentences; they did not appeal the convictions.
- Within a year, they filed 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motions arguing their § 924(c) convictions were invalid because the predicate offense (armed bank robbery) is not a “crime of violence.”
- The district court denied the § 2255 motions but granted certificates of appealability; the government raised no procedural bar on appeal.
- The Ninth Circuit applied the categorical approach to decide whether bank robbery under § 2113(a) qualifies as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A) (the force clause).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) is a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A) | Bank robbery qualifies as a crime of violence because it necessarily involves force sufficient to cause pain or injury | § 2113(a)’s "by intimidation" (or least violent means) can be satisfied without violent physical force; thus § 2113(a) need not be a crime of violence | § 2113(a) (robbery “by force and violence, or by intimidation”) is a crime of violence under the force clause |
| Whether the mental state for "intimidation" permits only negligent conduct (thus avoiding the required mens rea for a crime of violence) | N/A (government rejects negligent-intimidation theory) | A reasonable-victim standard could convict for negligent intimidation, failing Leocal’s requirement of a higher mental state | Conviction requires at least knowing use of intimidation per Carter; negligent-only intimidation cannot sustain § 2113(a) conviction |
| Whether § 2113(a) is indivisible so that an extortion-based theory (less violent) could be the least-violent means, defeating categorical treatment | N/A | § 2113(a) is a single indivisible offense with alternative means including extortion, and extortion may not be a crime of violence | § 2113(a) is divisible between robbery and extortion; defendants were convicted of robbery, so extortion concern is inapplicable |
| Whether armed bank robbery under § 2113(a) & (d) can be less violent than unarmed bank robbery | N/A | Armed robbery could be charged differently such that less force might suffice | Armed robbery requires all elements of unarmed robbery; it cannot be based on less force and thus qualifies as a crime of violence under § 924(c) |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (defines "violent" physical force requirement for force clause)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (categorical approach to statutory elements)
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (least-violent-offense principle in categorical analysis)
- United States v. Gutierrez, 876 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir.) (held § 2113(a) "intimidation" requires fear of bodily harm; robbery is a crime of violence)
- Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (mens rea for § 2113 requires knowledge regarding taking by force, violence, or intimidation)
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (crime-of-violence requires more than negligent conduct)
- United States v. Coleman, 208 F.3d 786 (armed robbery conviction requires proof of unarmed robbery elements)