United States v. Mann
899 F.3d 898
10th Cir.2018Background
- Defendant Clay O’Brien Mann, a Navajo tribal member, fired a rifle at neighbors after a bonfire, killing one and wounding two; he was prosecuted on multiple counts including assault resulting in serious bodily injury (18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(6)) and a § 924(c) firearm-enhancement count alleging the firearm was used in relation to a crime of violence.
- An earlier indictment error led to dismissal and refiling; after a mistrial on the corrected § 924(c) charge, the government reindicted and Mann moved to dismiss, arguing § 113(a)(6) is not a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A).
- The district court dismissed, reasoning § 113(a)(6) can be violated with a mens rea of recklessness, and Tenth Circuit precedent treated recklessness as insufficient to satisfy the "use of physical force" element for crime-of-violence definitions.
- The government appealed; the Tenth Circuit reviewed de novo whether § 113(a)(6) categorically "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force" under § 924(c)(3)(A).
- The panel applied the categorical approach, considered Supreme Court and circuit precedent (notably Leocal, Voisine), and concluded Voisine’s reasoning that reckless conduct can be a volitional "use" of force extends to § 924(c)(3)(A).
- The court held § 113(a)(6) is categorically a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A) (accepting defendant’s concession that the statute’s least culpable mental state is recklessness), reversed the district court, and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether assault resulting in serious bodily injury (§ 113(a)(6)) is a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A) | Government: § 113(a)(6) necessarily involves the use of physical force and qualifies under § 924(c)(3)(A) | Mann: § 113(a)(6) can be satisfied by recklessness (or lower), and Tenth Circuit precedent rejects recklessness as meeting the "use of force" element | Held: Yes; Voisine’s reasoning extends so reckless conduct can constitute the volitional "use of physical force" under § 924(c)(3)(A) |
| Whether Voisine abrogates prior Tenth Circuit recklessness precedents (e.g., Zuniga‑Soto) | Gov: Voisine supports treating reckless assaults as volitional uses of force for crime-of-violence purposes | Mann: Voisine leaves intact earlier precedents; distinctions between statutes matter | Held: Voisine’s reasoning extends to § 924(c)(3)(A); prior cases do not control here |
| Whether the phrase "against the person or property of another" narrows § 924(c)(3)(A) to require specific intent to target a person/property | Mann: the "against" clause requires intent to apply force to person/property, distinguishing § 924(c)(3)(A) from statutes in Voisine/Pam | Gov: "Or property" only broadens victims; it does not impose a higher mens rea requirement | Held: The court rejects Mann’s narrowing—text supports broader reach and no heightened mens rea |
| Whether rule of lenity requires a narrow construction in defendant’s favor | Mann: any ambiguity should be resolved for defendant | Government: statutory interpretation tools yield a clear meaning | Held: No lenity—statutory interpretation yields a specific meaning supporting the government |
Key Cases Cited
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) (a statute reaching negligent or accidental conduct is not a crime of violence because "use" requires active employment of force)
- Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016) (reckless assaults involve a volitional "use" of force for purposes of certain federal firearms prohibitions)
- United States v. Zunie, 444 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 2006) (interpreting § 113(a)(6) and discussing mens rea; recklessness can suffice under § 113(a)(6))
- United States v. Zuniga‑Soto, 527 F.3d 1110 (10th Cir. 2008) (held recklessness did not satisfy "use of physical force" under guideline definition before Voisine)
- United States v. Pam, 867 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. 2017) (applied Voisine reasoning to hold certain offenses involving recklessness can meet ACCA/force definitions)
- United States v. Hammons, 862 F.3d 1052 (10th Cir. 2017) (applied Voisine logic in ACCA context and questioned continuing vitality of Zuniga‑Soto)
- United States v. Verwiebe, 874 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2017) (concluded assault causing serious bodily injury necessarily involves force)
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) (categorical approach requires presuming conviction rested on least culpable conduct)