United States v. Luis Moreira Bravo, 56 F.4th 568

Defendant Luis Alfredo Moreira-Bravo (26) drove from Minnesota to Iowa in May 2020, met 14-year-old R.M., had sexual intercourse in his car, then transported her to Minnesota and had sex again. R.M. told him she was at least 19.
Arrested May 7; he claimed he believed she was 19. Indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) (transporting a person under 18 in interstate commerce with intent that they engage in prostitution or criminal sexual activity).
Moved in limine to require jury instructions that the Government must prove (1) he knew the transported person was under 18, and (2) he intended the sexual activity to be unlawful; the district court denied the motion.
Moreira-Bravo entered a conditional guilty plea reserving the right to appeal the denial; plea stipulated he transported R.M. intending sexual activity and was over 120 months older than her; underlying Minnesota statutory-rape provision barred mistake-of-age when defendant is >120 months older.
The Eighth Circuit reviewed statutory interpretation de novo and addressed two mens rea questions: whether “knowingly” applies to the victim’s age, and whether “with intent that” requires intent that the sexual activity be unlawful.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 2423(a)’s “knowingly” requires proof that the defendant knew the transported person was under 18	Moreira‑Bravo: Flores‑Figueroa and Rehaif presumptions mean “knowingly” applies to the age element; government must prove he knew she was a minor	Government/Eighth Circuit: historical context of child‑sex laws, defendant’s opportunity to observe the victim, and §2423’s text and context rebut the presumption; age is a strict‑liability element	Court: “knowingly” need not apply to age; knowledge of victim’s age not required for §2423(a) conviction
Whether the phrase “with intent that” requires proof defendant intended the sexual activity to be unlawful (beyond intending the sexual act itself)	Moreira‑Bravo: statute requires specific intent that the sexual activity be unlawful	Government/Eighth Circuit: statute requires intent that the person engage in sexual activity and that the activity be criminal as a matter of fact, but not intent or knowledge that the conduct is unlawful; ignorance of law is no excuse	Court: Government need only prove (1) intent that the transported person engage in sexual activity and (2) that the sexual activity was unlawful; no requirement to prove defendant intended or knew it was illegal

Flores‑Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009) (presumption that a mens rea adverb applies to subsequently listed elements, but can be rebutted by context)
Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019) (mens rea generally applies to elements that separate innocent from criminal conduct)
Ruan v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2370 (2022) (presumption of scienter applies to limit criminal liability and protect against convicting those lacking a vicious will)
United States v. X‑Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994) (knowledge of victim’s age required for certain child‑pornography statutes because visual depiction increases risk of mistake)
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) (Blackstone’s vicious‑will principle and recognition of strict‑liability exceptions in some sex‑offense contexts)
United States v. Bruguier, 735 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (application of mens rea to victim’s incapacity status and discussion of when context rebuts scienter presumption)
Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351 (2014) (canon that Congress’s inclusion of language in one section but omission in another implies different meaning)