Background - FBI seized and operated Playpen, a Tor hidden-service child-pornography site, from Virginia and installed a Network Investigative Technique (NIT) on the site to identify users. - The NIT augmented downloaded content so that activating computers (users who logged into Playpen) would transmit seven identifying data points (e.g., actual IP address, MAC address, host name) back to the FBI. - The NIT identified a Playpen user whose IP traced to Alex Levin’s residence in Norwood, Massachusetts; the FBI obtained a Massachusetts search warrant, searched Levin’s computer, and recovered alleged child pornography. - Levin moved to suppress evidence obtained via the NIT warrant (issued in the Eastern District of Virginia) and the downstream Massachusetts warrant; the district court granted suppression, holding the NIT warrant was void for lack of magistrate jurisdiction under Rule 41 and that suppression was required. - The First Circuit reversed, holding that even if the NIT warrant were unauthorized, the Leon good-faith exception applied because the executing officers reasonably and objectively relied on a magistrate-issued warrant and there was no conduct warranting exclusion. ### Issues | Issue | Levin's Argument | Government's Argument | Held | |---|---:|---|---| | Whether the NIT warrant was invalid because the issuing magistrate lacked jurisdiction under Rule 41 | NIT warrant was void ab initio because it authorized searches outside the issuing district | Magistrate issued a warrant after a detailed affidavit describing scope; Rule 41 was a novel issue and magistrate authorization was reasonable | Court assumed potential Rule 41 problem but did not decide validity; applied good-faith exception to admit evidence | | Whether the NIT warrant was a general/overbroad warrant lacking particularity | Warrant resembled a general warrant; lacked sufficient particularity about places to be searched | Warrant specifically limited searches to "activating computers" of Playpen users and described what data to be seized | Warrant was particular enough that officers could reasonably rely on it; not a general warrant | | Whether suppression is appropriate despite a warrant defect | Suppression required because magistrate lacked authority and there was prejudice; no judicial approval effectively existed | Exclusionary rule aims to deter culpable police conduct; here officers acted objectively reasonably relying on a magistrate-issued warrant | Suppression not warranted under Leon; good-faith reliance defeats exclusion | | Whether any Leon exception exceptions apply (e.g., magistrate lied, abandoned role, affidavit lacked indicia of probable cause, warrant facially deficient) | Argues warrant was so deficient that Leon does not apply | Government: no false/misleading affidavit, magistrate did not abandon role, and warrant was not facially deficient | None of Leon’s exceptions applied; officers’ reliance was objectively reasonable | ### Key Cases Cited United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (establishes good-faith exception to exclusionary rule) Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (limits exclusion when officers act in objectively reasonable good faith) Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (discusses scope of exclusionary rule and "fruit of the poisonous tree") Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (analyzes deterrence justification for exclusion) Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (distinguishes general warrants and particularity requirement) United States v. Woodbury, 511 F.3d 93 (1st Cir. 2007) (warrant facial-deficiency standard) United States v. Ninety-Two Thousand Four Hundred Twenty-Two Dollars & Fifty-Seven Cents, 307 F.3d 137 (3d Cir. 2002) (distinguishes overly broad warrants from general warrants) New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (recognizes serious national interest in preventing child pornography) * Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (discusses technological facilitation of child-pornography distribution)