946 F.3d 643
4th Cir.2020Background
- Defendant Lester Dean George (Trinidad and Tobago national) overstayed a temporary U.S. visa and, in 2013, used a deceased person’s name, date of birth, and SSN to attempt to obtain a HUD-insured home loan.
- George was indicted on two counts: false representation of a Social Security number (42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B)) and aggravated identity theft (18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1)).
- George pleaded guilty to both counts but moved to withdraw his guilty plea as to the aggravated-identity-theft count after the district court had ruled that § 1028A(a)(1) does not cover deceased victims.
- The district court permitted withdrawal of the plea and dismissed the aggravated-identity-theft count; George received time served on the remaining count.
- The Government appealed the dismissal, raising the question whether the statutory phrase “means of identification of another person” includes deceased persons.
- The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for resentencing, holding that § 1028A(a)(1) covers deceased victims.
Issues
| Issue | United States' Argument | George's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether “another person” in 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) includes deceased victims | Ordinary meaning of “person” includes living and dead; statutory context (a)(2)) and legislative history support inclusion; consistency with sister circuits | Some statutory uses and state statutes distinguish “deceased” persons, and district court previously held the statute excludes deceased victims | “Person” includes deceased victims; aggravated identity theft conviction may stand and case remanded for resentencing |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Zuniga-Arteaga, 681 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2012) (holds § 1028A covers identities of deceased persons)
- United States v. LaFaive, 618 F.3d 613 (7th Cir. 2010) (interprets “person” to include deceased victims under § 1028A)
- United States v. Maciel-Alcala, 612 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2010) (same conclusion on § 1028A)
- United States v. Kowal, 527 F.3d 741 (8th Cir. 2008) (same conclusion and policy reasoning about detection and harm)
- United States v. Jimenez, 507 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2007) (same conclusion regarding deceased victims)
- United States v. Hilton, 701 F.3d 959 (4th Cir. 2012) (distinguishes “person” and “individual” when applying rule of lenity to corporate victims)
- Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998) (explains that the rule of lenity applies only if ambiguity persists after exhausting interpretive tools)