United States v. Lawrence Johnson
708 F. App'x 245
| 6th Cir. | 2017Background
- Lawrence Johnson pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm; at sentencing the district court applied the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) and imposed the 180‑month mandatory minimum.
- The ACCA enhancement was based on four prior Ohio convictions: attempted robbery (1982), robbery (1983, Pre‑Senate Bill Two), robbery (1997, Post‑Senate Bill Two), and complicity to commit aggravated robbery (2005).
- The Government relied on the ACCA elements‑of‑force clause (use/attempted use/threatened use of physical force) because the ACCA residual clause was invalidated and none of Johnson’s priors were enumerated offenses.
- The court applied the categorical approach to decide whether the Ohio statutes categorically required "physical force" as defined by federal law (i.e., "violent force").
- This Circuit recently held that Ohio’s Pre‑Senate Bill Two robbery statute can be satisfied by minimal contact (e.g., purse snatching, bumping), and therefore criminalizes a broader range of conduct than the federal generic robbery/violent‑force requirement.
- Because the Pre‑Senate Bill Two convictions do not categorically qualify as violent felonies, Johnson lacked the three predicate offenses required for ACCA; the sentence was vacated and the case remanded for resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Johnson’s Pre‑Senate Bill Two robbery/attempted robbery convictions qualify as ACCA violent felonies under the elements‑of‑force clause | Johnson: Ohio’s force element allows minimal contact/compulsion that is not "violent force," so convictions do not categorically qualify | Government: Ohio’s force element satisfies ACCA’s "physical force" requirement | The court held Pre‑Senate Bill Two robbery/attempted robbery do not categorically qualify as violent felonies under ACCA, so they cannot serve as predicates |
| Whether other prior convictions (Post‑Senate Bill Two robbery and complicity to commit aggravated robbery) must be decided to resolve ACCA enhancement | Johnson: Not necessary if Pre‑Senate Bill Two convictions fail to qualify | Government: Would argue remaining priors qualify | Court: Did not decide those priors because vacating the Pre‑Senate Bill Two predicates eliminated the three required ACCA predicates; remanded for resentencing |
| Proper approach to interpret "physical force" in §924(e)(2)(B)(i) | Johnson: Federal definition of "physical force" requires violent force; Ohio’s definition is broader | Government: Ohio convictions should be treated as violent felonies | Court: Applied federal definition (violent force) and state‑law elements; concluded Ohio Pre‑Senate Bill Two statute is broader and insufficient |
| Use of categorical approach to ACCA predicate analysis | Johnson: Categorical approach requires comparing statutory elements, not underlying facts | Government: Categorical approach should still find elements satisfy ACCA | Court: Reaffirmed categorical approach and applied it to find the Ohio statute overbroad |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (defines "physical force" under ACCA as "violent force")
- Castleman v. United States, 572 U.S. 157 (2014) (clarifies that minor/nonviolent contact may not satisfy federal "physical force" requirement)
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) (explains categorical approach and presumption of minimum conduct)
- United States v. Mitchell, 743 F.3d 1054 (6th Cir. 2014) (states that crime‑elements are a question of state law but "physical force" is federal)
- United States v. Anderson, 695 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2012) (standard of review for ACCA predicate determinations)
- United States v. McMurray, 653 F.3d 367 (6th Cir. 2011) (equates ACCA "violent felony" and Sentencing Guidelines "crime of violence" analyses)
- United States v. Gibbs, 626 F.3d 344 (6th Cir. 2010) (discusses analysis parallels between ACCA and Guidelines)