United States v. Lara
970 F.3d 68
| 1st Cir. | 2020Background
- Victor Lara and Kourtney Williams were arrested in August 2014 in connection with a robbery of Ross Tardif's residence in Maine; federal charges followed in 2015.
- The federal indictment charged each with Hobbs Act conspiracy and a § 924(c) offense (use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence); Williams also faced a § 922(g)(1) felon-in-possession count.
- At trial (Sept. 2016) Lara and Williams were acquitted of the drug-distribution conspiracy but convicted of Hobbs Act conspiracy and § 924(c); Douglas, a co-defendant, pleaded guilty earlier.
- District Court sentenced both Lara and Williams to 184 months (Hobbs Act and consecutive § 924(c) sentence among components). Appeals were consolidated.
- After briefing, the Supreme Court decided Davis (invalidating § 924(c)’s residual clause) and Rehaif (requiring knowledge-of-status for § 922(g)); the panel considered the effects of those decisions on the convictions.
- The First Circuit affirmed all convictions except reversed the § 924(c) convictions (Davis), vacated related sentences, and addressed multiple ancillary challenges (instructions, hearsay, speedy-trial, Rehaif issues) largely against the defendants.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hobbs Act conspiracy qualified as a "crime of violence" for § 924(c) after Davis | Lara/Williams: Davis invalidates § 924(c) residual clause, so Hobbs Act conspiracy no longer qualifies | Government: after Davis the predicate no longer satisfies § 924(c) residual clause either | Court: Agreed with parties; § 924(c) convictions reversed (Davis) |
| Jury instructions and jury-question responses re: object of Hobbs conspiracy (Williams) | Williams: instructions and answers constructively amended indictment and failed to require personal intent | Government: defense counsel invited/approved language; waiver; instructions as a whole adequate | Court: claims waived or forfeited by counsel; no reversible plain error |
| District Court's answer to jury about witness testimony (factfinding) | Williams: court usurped jury by saying witness "implied" Tardif had oxycodone; prejudicial | Government: testimony supported the shorthand answer; no clear or obvious error | Court: no plain error; answer not a clear mischaracterization |
| Admissibility of Hutchinson's testimony about Hartford under co-conspirator exception (Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E)) | Williams: testimony was hearsay and insufficiently corroborated to show Hartford was in same conspiracy/object | Government: corroborating evidence (planning meetings, Tardif testimony, Hutchinson's role) showed preponderance that Hartford shared drug-focused robbery objective | Court: District Court did not abuse discretion or clearly err; testimony admissible |
| Lara's speedy-trial claim under Barker v. Wingo | Lara: delay measured from state arrest produced excessive delay and prejudice | Government: speedy clock measured from federal accusation; delay mainly due to co-defendants and motions; little prejudice | Court: applied Dowdell; measured from federal accusation; no Sixth Amendment violation |
| Rehaif impacts on Williams's § 922(g) conviction: sufficiency, indictment, and jury instructions | Williams: insufficient evidence of knowledge-of-status; indictment failed to allege knowledge; instructions omitted element | Government: stipulation of prior convictions and circumstantial evidence support knowledge; indictment proper at time; plain error review defeats reversal given overwhelming/unchallenged proof | Court: sufficiency claim fails; indictment omission was clear error but not prejudicial on plain-error review; instructional error not reversible under plain-error prongs |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (Struck down § 924(c) residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
- Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019) (Requires government to prove defendant knew his prohibited status under § 922(g))
- United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1977) (Framework for provisional admission of co-conspirator statements)
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (Four-factor speedy-trial balancing test)
- Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992) (Prejudice categories in speedy-trial analysis)
- United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002) (Defects in indictment do not deprive court of jurisdiction; impact on plain-error analysis)
- Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974) (Indictment must allege elements of offense)
- United States v. Burghardt, 939 F.3d 397 (1st Cir. 2019) (Post-Rehaif discussion of indictment and jurisdiction issues)