United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625

Background

The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) bars tort suits against the United States unless the claimant: (1) presents the claim to the appropriate federal agency within two years of accrual, and (2) files suit in federal court within six months after the agency denies the claim (28 U.S.C. §2401(b)).
Kwai Fun Wong timely presented an administrative FTCA claim and sought to add the FTCA claim to an existing federal suit; a district court delayed adopting a magistrate judge’s recommendation, causing Wong to miss the six-month filing window for court suit. The district court later held §2401(b)’s six-month rule jurisdictional and dismissed; the Ninth Circuit en banc reversed, allowing equitable tolling.
Marlene June discovered alleged federal involvement years after a fatal 2005 highway accident and presented an FTCA claim to FHWA more than two years after accrual; the agency denied the claim and she filed suit, but the district court dismissed as time-barred under §2401(b). The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding the two-year presentation period tollable.
The Government argued that §2401(b)’s time limits are jurisdictional (non-tollable) because they condition the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity and use the traditional phrase "shall be forever barred," echoing Tucker Act language.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether §2401(b)’s two-year and six-month limits are subject to equitable tolling and affirmed the Ninth Circuit: FTCA time bars are non‑jurisdictional and may be equitably tolled.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether §2401(b)’s limitations are subject to equitable tolling	Wong/June: equitable tolling applies when plaintiffs diligently pursued claims or were prevented by extraordinary circumstances	United States: §2401(b) is jurisdictional and thus not tollable; it conditions waiver of sovereign immunity and uses "shall be forever barred" language	The Court held §2401(b) nonjurisdictional and subject to equitable tolling under Irwin’s presumption
Whether the phrase "shall be forever barred" renders the statute jurisdictional	Plaintiffs: phrase is ordinary limitations language and does not speak to court power	Government: the phrase previously marked the Tucker Act’s jurisdictional deadline and thus implies the same here	The Court held the phrase alone does not show clear congressional intent to make the bar jurisdictional
Whether a time limit that conditions waiver of sovereign immunity is necessarily jurisdictional	Plaintiffs: Irwin presumes tolling even in statutes waiving immunity; FTCA treats government like a private party	Government: conditions on waivers historically were strictly observed and jurisdictional	The Court rejected the Government’s historic-warning argument, applying Irwin and treating such limits like ordinary claim‑processing rules
Whether legislative history or statutory context shows Congress intended §2401(b) to be jurisdictional	Plaintiffs: context (separate jurisdictional grant in §1346(b)(1)) and lack of clear legislative statement support nonjurisdictional reading	Government: historical practice and FTCA’s relation to Tucker Act suggest jurisdictional meaning	The Court found no clear statement in text, context, or history to rebut Irwin’s presumption; tolling available; remanded to consider facts-specific tolling issues

Key Cases Cited

Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990) (presumption that statutes waiving sovereign immunity are subject to equitable tolling)
John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130 (2008) (discussing Tucker Act time bar, stare decisis, and similarities in language)
American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974) (construed similar "shall be forever barred" language as not restricting courts’ equitable powers)
Kendall v. United States, 107 U.S. 123 (1883) (early decision treating Tucker Act–style limitation as jurisdictional)
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006) (statutory limits are jurisdictional only when Congress clearly states so)
Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center, 568 U.S. 145 (2013) (explaining the clear‑statement rule for labeling provisions jurisdictional)