988 F.3d 1054
8th Cir.2021Background
- In 2014 Burgee pleaded guilty in South Dakota to "sexual exploitation of a minor" after DNA consistent with sexual contact was recovered from a 14‑year‑old; he acknowledged required sex‑offender registration and a psychosexual evaluation.
- He registered under SORNA and state law for about two years, then stopped; in 2018 he was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) for failing to register.
- At the federal bench trial the government introduced evidence beyond the state plea record: the victim’s recorded forensic interview (waivers to hearsay/foundation at trial), nurse practitioner medical records consistent with rape, and DNA matching Burgee.
- The district court applied the circumstance‑specific approach and found the prior conviction qualified under 34 U.S.C. § 20911(7)(I) as an offense involving "conduct that by its nature is a sex offense against a minor," then convicted Burgee of failure to register.
- On appeal Burgee argued (1) the categorical approach should apply (overruling United States v. Hill), (2) if circumstance‑specific applies the court must rely only on plea‑hearing facts/documents, and (3) § 20911(7)(I) is void for vagueness. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper interpretive approach for § 20911(7)(I) (categorical vs circumstance‑specific) | Burgee: apply categorical approach; Hill should be overruled | Government/Court: Hill controls; statutory reference to "conduct" requires circumstance‑specific review | Court: Affirms Hill; circumstance‑specific approach applies |
| Scope of evidence when using circumstance‑specific approach | Burgee: limited to plea colloquy and Shepard‑authorized documents | Government/Court: district courts may consider any reliable admissible evidence | Court: Any reliable evidence admissible; district court properly relied on trial evidence |
| Vagueness of § 20911(7)(I) | Burgee: statute is vague and unconstitutional | Government/Court: as applied to Burgee, statute clearly proscribed his conduct | Court: Statute not void for vagueness as applied to Burgee |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Hill, 820 F.3d 1003 (8th Cir. 2016) (adopting circumstance‑specific approach for § 20911(7)(I))
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (limits documents examinable under categorical approach at sentencing)
- Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (interpreting statute defining "crime of violence" and endorsing categorical approach where text demands it)
- United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (statutory text can command categorical approach for certain offense definitions)
- Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009) (distinguishing statute‑text that requires circumstance‑specific inquiry)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (explaining jury factfinding and limits on judge‑made sentencing factfinding)