122 F.4th 740
9th Cir.2024Background
- ICE used Boeing Field, operated by King County, for charter flights transporting removable aliens, relying on fixed base operators (FBOs) for essential services.
- In 2019, King County issued Executive Order PFC-7-1-EO prohibiting FBOs from servicing ICE charter flights, motivated by disagreement with federal immigration policy and human rights concerns.
- Following the Order, all FBOs at Boeing Field ceased providing services to ICE, effectively blocking ICE operations at the airport.
- The United States sued King County, arguing the Order violated federal intergovernmental immunity and breached a WWII-era Instrument of Transfer granting the U.S. nonexclusive airport use rights.
- The district court granted summary judgment for the U.S., enjoining enforcement of the Order; King County appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing & Ripeness | U.S. has injury from ICE being blocked at Boeing Field; harm traceable to Order; redressable by court order | The Order is policy with no legal effect; dispute is speculative/premature | United States has standing, claims are ripe; injury is concrete and traceable to Order |
| Instrument of Transfer Violation | Order prevents mandated federal nonexclusive access to airport; violates contract terms | Instrument applies only to government-owned/leased aircraft; courts lack jurisdiction | Order violates Instrument by barring ICE-related charter flights; district court had jurisdiction |
| Intergovernmental Immunity | Order discriminates, interferes with federal operations by targeting ICE flights and contractors | County can regulate as property owner; Order justified by business/protest concerns | Executive Order discriminates against federal government/contractors; violates Supremacy Clause |
| Anti-Commandeering/Market Participant | Invalidating Order is not commandeering; County isn’t just acting as market participant | Order reflects county's proprietary, protest-driven concerns; anti-commandeering doctrine applies | No commandeering; County acted as regulator, not market participant; doctrines offer no defense |
Key Cases Cited
- Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (federal government has broad authority over immigration)
- Leslie Miller, Inc. v. Arkansas, 352 U.S. 187 (states cannot regulate federal contractors in ways affecting federal discretion)
- North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423 (state laws regulating/discriminating against U.S. or its contractors violate intergovernmental immunity)
- Davis v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (state discrimination against federal entities must be justified by real differences)
- Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (anti-commandeering doctrine limits federal ability to require state implementation of federal programs)
- Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 584 U.S. 453 (states can't be compelled by federal government to enforce federal regulatory schemes)
- California v. United States, 921 F.3d 865 (Supremacy Clause prevents states from controlling federal operations)
- S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (market participant doctrine relates to proprietary state actions in preemption/Dormant Commerce Clause contexts)
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (standing requirements under Article III)