894 F.3d 974
8th Cir.2018Background
- Doyal pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2).
- At sentencing the district court applied U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) to raise the base offense level because of a prior Missouri conviction for second-degree domestic assault (Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.073), yielding a guidelines range of 37–46 months; the court imposed 40 months.
- The Guidelines define a “crime of violence” to include offenses with an element of the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force (the force clause); the court must apply the categorical approach and, for divisible statutes, the modified categorical approach.
- § 565.073.1 (as enacted) contained three subsections: (1) attempts or knowingly causing physical injury (including by weapon or choking), (2) recklessly causing serious physical injury, and (3) recklessly causing physical injury by a deadly weapon.
- The district court relied on state charging documents (a First Amended Information and judgment) that charged Doyal with attempting to cause serious physical injury by striking the victim with an automobile; the Eighth Circuit concluded those documents established conviction under § 565.073.1(1), a crime of violence under the Guidelines.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Missouri second-degree domestic assault (§ 565.073) is a crime of violence under the Guidelines’ force clause | Doyal: § 565.073 is overbroad/indivisible and thus not categorically a crime of violence | Government: § 565.073 is divisible; convictions under subsection (1) involve attempt/use of force and qualify | Held: § 565.073 is divisible; conviction falls under § 565.073.1(1), which is a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1) |
| Whether the modified categorical approach may be used after Mathis | Doyal: Mathis makes prior controlling precedent inapplicable; statute’s alternatives make it indivisible | Government: Phillips on remand controls; Mathis does not change divisibility here | Held: Phillips on remand is controlling; the panel applied the modified categorical approach |
| Whether the state charging documents proved which subsection Doyal violated | Doyal: The charging papers did not specify the subsection and tracked multiple subsections | Government: The First Amended Information charged an attempted causing of serious physical injury, which tracks subsection (1) | Held: The Information and judgment conclusively establish conviction under § 565.073.1(1) (attempt), so no remand required |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Harrison, 809 F.3d 420 (8th Cir.) (standard of review cited)
- United States v. McGee, 890 F.3d 730 (8th Cir. 2018) (categorical/modified categorical approach explained)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (distinguishes statutes with alternative elements from statutes with alternative means)
- United States v. Phillips, 817 F.3d 567 (8th Cir. 2016) (initially held § 565.073 divisible)
- Phillips v. United States, 853 F.3d 432 (8th Cir. 2017) (decision on remand concluding Mathis did not alter divisibility determination)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (permissible documents for modified categorical approach)
- United States v. Scott, 818 F.3d 424 (8th Cir. 2016) (§ 565.073.1(1) constitutes a crime of violence)
- United States v. Haileselassie, 668 F.3d 1033 (8th Cir. 2012) (attempt/knowing causation qualifies as force clause offense)
- United States v. Mata, 869 F.3d 640 (8th Cir. 2017) (construing ACCA violent felony and Guidelines crime of violence definitions as interchangeable)
- Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016) (discusses reckless misdemeanor assaults in force/violence context)