964 F.3d 386
5th Cir.2020Background:
- In 2014 Joshua Wallace pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm; the district court applied the ACCA 15-year mandatory minimum based on three prior Texas burglary convictions.
- Wallace’s conviction and sentence were previously affirmed on appeal; he later filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion challenging the ACCA enhancement.
- The central legal question was whether Texas Penal Code § 30.02(a) defines “burglary” in a manner that is "generic" under Taylor v. United States and thus qualifies as an ACCA violent-felony predicate.
- Wallace argued § 30.02(a)(3) permits conviction without proving intent at the time of entry, rendering the statute broader than the generic definition and therefore non-generic.
- The Fifth Circuit’s en banc decision in United States v. Herrold (Herrold II) held § 30.02(a) is generic; the court here applied that precedent and relied on Texas authority (DeVaughn) that (a)(3) supplies the intent element via the subsequent commission or attempt of a crime.
- The district court’s denial of Wallace’s § 2255 motion (and the ACCA enhancement) was affirmed.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Tex. Penal Code § 30.02(a) is a "generic" burglary for ACCA purposes | Wallace: §30.02(a)(3) lacks an intent-at-entry element, so the statute is broader than Taylor’s generic burglary | Government/Fifth Circuit: Herrold II controls; Texas law (DeVaughn and commentary) treats (a)(3) as requiring intent through commission/attempt, making the statute generic | The court held §30.02(a) is generic; Wallace’s prior burglary convictions qualify as ACCA predicates and §2255 relief is denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (defined the elements of "generic" burglary for ACCA)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (distinguished generic from non-generic statutes for predicate enhancement analysis)
- United States v. Herrold, 941 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (held Texas §30.02(a) is generic burglary)
- United States v. Herrold, 883 F.3d 517 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (earlier en banc decision addressing the same issue, later vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court)
- DeVaughn v. State, 749 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (interpreted §30.02(a)(3) as supplying intent via subsequent commission/attempt)
- United States v. Castillo-Rivera, 853 F.3d 218 (5th Cir. 2017) (explained limits on federal courts’ reliance when a defendant fails to cite relevant state law)
- United States v. Bonilla, 687 F.3d 188 (4th Cir. 2012) (reasoned that attempt/commission elements supply requisite intent)
- Van Cannon v. United States, 890 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2018) (concluded a similarly worded state burglary statute lacked an intent requirement)
- Quarles v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1872 (2019) (Supreme Court authority referenced as influencing the statutory-analysis framework)