United States v. Joseph Simms
914 F.3d 229
4th Cir.2019Background
- Defendant Joseph Simms pleaded guilty to Hobbs Act conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 1951) and to brandishing a firearm in relation to a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).
- § 924(c)(3) defines “crime of violence” by two clauses: (A) an elements-based force clause, and (B) a residual clause covering offenses that “by their nature” involve a substantial risk that force may be used.
- Simms conceded his Hobbs Act conspiracy did not categorically qualify under § 924(c)(3)(A); the government relied on § 924(c)(3)(B).
- After sentencing, Supreme Court decisions (Johnson and subsequently Dimaya) invalidated materially similar residual clauses as unconstitutionally vague when applied via the ordinary‑case categorical approach.
- The government urged a conduct-specific (case‑by‑case) reading of § 924(c)(3)(B) to avoid vagueness; the court examined statutory text, structure, precedent, and constitutional‑avoidance principles.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Simms) | Defendant's Argument (United States) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause | § 924(c)(3)(B), read via the ordinary‑case categorical approach, is indistinct and therefore void for vagueness (relying on Johnson/Dimaya) | Initially conceded categorical reading but later urged a conduct‑specific reading to cure vagueness | The court held § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague when interpreted under the ordinary‑case categorical approach and invalidated the residual clause |
| Proper method of statutory interpretation for § 924(c)(3)(B): categorical vs. conduct‑specific | N/A (Simms’ position depends on categorical invalidation) | Argues courts should adopt a conduct‑specific approach (consider actual offense conduct) to save the statute | The court concluded the text, context, and precedent compel an ordinary‑case categorical reading; the government’s conduct‑specific alternative is not a plausible textual construction |
| Applicability of constitutional‑avoidance to adopt a saving construction | N/A | Urges judicial narrowing (conduct‑specific reading) to avoid invalidation | Court held avoidance cannot justify rewriting § 924(c)(3)(B); no fairly possible textually plausible construction would save it |
| Effect of holding on sentencing and prosecutions that used § 924(c)(3)(B) | N/A | Emphasizes reliance/finality interests and contemporaneous proof could avoid Sixth Amendment issues | Court limited its holding: invalidates only the residual clause (B); elements clause (A) and other statutory provisions remain intact; Congress may legislate a clearer replacement |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (ACCA residual‑clause holding: ordinary‑case categorical approach combined with an indeterminate risk threshold renders that residual clause void for vagueness)
- Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (plurality) (applies Johnson to § 16(b), holding materially identical language void for vagueness under the ordinary‑case categorical approach)
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) (interprets materially identical "by its nature" language to require a categorical focus on the offense rather than specific facts)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (establishes the elements‑based categorical approach for prior‑conviction sentencing enhancements)
- Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993) (explains § 924(c) requires proof of both an underlying predicate offense and a separate firearm‑use element)
- Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65 (2014) (describes § 924(c) as punishing the temporal and relational conjunction of separate acts that together create extreme risk)