United States v. Jose Sanchez-Sanchez, 779 F.3d 300

Sanchez‑Sanchez pleaded guilty in Texas (1990) to aggravated assault as charged in an indictment alleging use of a knife (aggravated assault with a deadly weapon); he received deferred adjudication probation which was later revoked and was adjudicated guilty.
The Texas written judgment recited conviction for "aggravated assault with a deadly weapon" but, in the judgment box labeled "Findings on Use of Deadly Weapon," checked or stated "no findings," reflecting Texas practice concerning separate deadly‑weapon findings.
In a later federal prosecution for illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326), the PSR applied a 12‑level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) based on the Texas aggravated assault as a qualifying "crime of violence."
Sanchez‑Sanchez did not object in district court to the enhancement but appealed, arguing the facial inconsistency between the indictment/judgment and the lack of a separate deadly‑weapon finding left doubt whether his prior conviction qualified as aggravated assault by use of a deadly weapon.
The Fifth Circuit examined whether Texas law permits a conviction for a deadly‑weapon aggravated assault despite the absence of a separate affirmative deadly‑weapon finding on the judgment and whether that prior conviction qualifies under the Guidelines’ categorical/modified categorical approach.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a Texas conviction that recites aggravated assault with a deadly weapon but contains no separate affirmative deadly‑weapon finding can qualify as a predicate "aggravated assault" crime of violence under the Guidelines	The absence of an affirmative deadly‑weapon finding in the judgment (and plea terms) raises doubt that the conviction was for the deadly‑weapon alternative, so the government failed to carry its burden	Texas law allows a conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon based on the plea/indictment even if the trial court did not enter a separate deadly‑weapon finding; the conviction therefore qualifies under the modified categorical approach	The absence of a separate deadly‑weapon entry in the judgment does not negate the underlying conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon; the prior conviction qualifies as a crime of violence and the enhancement was proper

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (establishing the categorical approach to determine whether prior offenses qualify)
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (limiting what documents sentencing courts may consult under the modified categorical approach)
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (explaining the modified categorical approach for divisible statutes)
Polk v. State, 693 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (describing when a jury's deadly‑weapon finding must be entered in the judgment)
Hooks v. State, 860 S.W.2d 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (holding a separate and specific deadly‑weapon entry is required on the judgment to trigger parole/probation consequences but recognizing practical distinctions)
United States v. Guillen‑Alvarez, 489 F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 2007) (concluding that an aggravated assault conviction specifying a deadly weapon qualifies as a crime of violence despite judgment nuances)
United States v. Fierro‑Reyna, 466 F.3d 324 (5th Cir. 2006) (defining the generic meaning of aggravated assault to include use of a deadly weapon)