United States v. Jose Narez-Garcia, 819 F.3d 146

Background

Narez-Garcia, a Mexican national, pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after removal and faced sentencing under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2.
Probation recommended an eight-level enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) because of a prior Arkansas conviction characterized as an aggravated felony (aggravated assault on a household member / domestic battery 3rd deg., 2nd offense).
The Arkansas Judgment recited a "suspended imposition of sentence" for 72 months and 12 months of probation; the "period of confinement" field was left blank.
At sentencing, Narez-Garcia objected only on the ground that the prior offense was not a "crime of violence" (no use-of-force element); he did not explicitly argue the prior sentence lacked a one-year term of imprisonment.
The district court overruled the objection, treated the domestic-battery conviction as an aggravated felony, and imposed a within-Guidelines 33-month sentence (plus a consecutive 18 months for supervised-release revocation).
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reviewed for plain error as to the unpreserved one-year imprisonment argument and affirmed, holding any error was not "clear or obvious."

Issues

Issue	Narez-Garcia's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether the district court plainly erred by applying the § 2L1.2 eight-level enhancement because the Arkansas conviction was not a "crime of violence" (use-of-force element)	Prior Arkansas offense lacks a use-of-force element or substantial-risk-of-force, so it is not a crime of violence	The convictions (particularly domestic battery) qualify as crimes of violence; enhancement proper	Court rejected defendant's preserved use-of-force objection at sentencing and upheld enhancement as applied by district court
Whether Narez-Garcia preserved for appeal the argument that the prior conviction did not include a term of imprisonment of at least one year (so it is not an "aggravated felony")	The Judgment did not impose an actual term of confinement (only suspended imposition + probation), so it lacks a one-year imprisonment term; challenge should be considered	Defendant did not raise the one-year imprisonment argument below; appellate review should be plain-error only	Court held defendant failed to preserve this specific ground; review limited to plain error and found reversal unwarranted
Whether a suspended imposition of sentence under Arkansas law counts as an imposed term of imprisonment for § 1101(a)(43)(F) purposes	The Arkansas procedure (suspended imposition) means no pronouncement of sentence and therefore no term of imprisonment	Precedent distinguishes suspended-imposition cases; if imprisonment is imposed then suspended, it counts; otherwise not	Court concluded the issue was unsettled under circuit precedent and Arkansas law, so any district-court error was not "clear or obvious" under plain-error review
Whether the sentencing relied on an unconstitutionally vague residual clause (§16(b)) after Gonzalez-Longoria/Johnson	§16(b) is void for vagueness; applying it to label the prior conviction a crime of violence is plain error	District court applied §16(a) (force element) not §16(b); Gonzalez-Longoria does not control	Majority held the district court relied on §16(a), so the vagueness argument fails; dissent argued the record shows §16(b) was applied and would require relief

Key Cases Cited

Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (plain-error review framework)
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (plain-error standard)
United States v. Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d 357 (5th Cir.) (distinguishing suspension vs probation for § 1101(a)(43)(F))
United States v. Vasquez-Balandran, 76 F.3d 648 (5th Cir.) (federal law governs whether state conviction counts as aggravated felony)
United States v. Landeros-Arreola, 260 F.3d 407 (5th Cir.) (reduction to probation vs suspended sentence distinction)
United States v. Juarez, 626 F.3d 246 (5th Cir.) (preservation vs plain-error review when different grounds raised)
United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 813 F.3d 225 (5th Cir.) (holding §16(b) residual clause unconstitutionally vague)