United States v. Jordan Lamott, 831 F.3d 1153

In 2013 Congress added 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(8) (assault of a spouse/intimate or dating partner by strangling, suffocating, or attempting to do so). The statute defines "strangling" in § 113(b)(4) as intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly impeding breathing or circulation, regardless of intent to kill or cause prolonged injury.
On March 28, 2014, Jordan Lamott (a Native American on the Blackfeet Reservation) strangled his girlfriend multiple times after drinking; she later sought medical treatment.
Lamott was charged under § 113(a)(8) and § 113(a)(6); a jury convicted him of assault by strangulation and the other count was dismissed after a hung jury. He was sentenced to 32 months and appealed.
On appeal Lamott raised two instructional errors (reviewed for plain error): (1) the district court told the jury to disregard voluntary intoxication (Lamott argued the offense is a specific-intent crime and intoxication is a defense); and (2) the court instructed the jury it must have "wounded" the victim by strangling rather than that it "assaulted" her, which Lamott argued relieved the government of proving elements.
The Ninth Circuit considered statutory text, the definition of "strangling," the broader legislative purpose protecting victims of domestic strangulation, and prior case law in deciding whether § 113(a)(8) requires specific or general intent.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Lamott)	Defendant's Argument (United States)	Held
Whether § 113(a)(8) is a specific-intent crime for which voluntary intoxication is a defense	§ 113(a)(8) incorporates common-law "assault" which is specific intent; intoxication can negate specific intent	The statute and its definition of "strangling," plus legislative purpose, show only general intent is required; intoxication is irrelevant	Held: § 113(a)(8) is a general-intent crime; voluntary intoxication is not a defense, so instruction to disregard intoxication was proper
Whether substituting "wounded" for "assaulted" in the jury instruction deprived Lamott of due process by relieving the government of proving elements beyond a reasonable doubt	The jury was told to find Lamott "wounded" J.F., not "assaulted," so elements in indictment/statute were misstated	The court also defined "strangling" and the jury necessarily found conduct amounting to assault; "wounded" was at worst superfluous and required proof beyond statute	Held: No plain error; substitution was harmless (wounding constitutes battery and supports assault conviction)

United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (discussion of mens rea difficulty)
United States v. Jim, 865 F.2d 211 (9th Cir.) (common-law assault and intent distinctions)
United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. en banc) (general vs specific intent analysis)
United States v. Lewellyn, 481 F.3d 695 (9th Cir.) (applying common-law assault to § 113 and battery supporting assault conviction)
United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10 (statutory adoption of common-law terms absent contrary intent)
Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (treatment of knowledge/recklessness and modern statutory approaches to assault/battery)
United States v. Meeker, 527 F.2d 12 (9th Cir.) (statutory language indicating general intent when phrase "with intent to" is absent)