United States v. Jones, 854 F.3d 737

Donshay Jones robbed a woman at gunpoint, took her car, and was arrested the next day with the stolen vehicle and an accomplice.
Indicted on two counts: carjacking (18 U.S.C. § 2119 & § 2) and using/brandishing a firearm in relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)).
Jones pleaded guilty while preserving two preserved challenges: (1) that § 2119 is unconstitutional as applied because the vehicle was no longer in interstate commerce, and (2) that carjacking is not a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3).
At plea Jones stipulated the car was manufactured out-of-state and had been transported into Texas years earlier.
District court denied both motions to dismiss; Jones appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 2119 is constitutional as applied given the vehicle was no longer moving in interstate commerce	Jones: vehicle had been in Texas for years; no substantial effect on interstate commerce; therefore § 2119 cannot apply	Government: minimal interstate-commerce nexus suffices where vehicle was transported in interstate commerce previously; precedent allows prosecution	Court: Affirmed—prior transportation in interstate commerce and precedent satisfy Commerce Clause nexus for § 2119
Whether carjacking qualifies as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3) and whether § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague	Jones: § 924(c)(3)(B) (the risk clause) is vague post-Johnson and carjacking does not always require threatened/used physical force under § 924(c)(3)(A) because it can be committed by “intimidation”	Government: Gonzalez-Longoria forecloses vagueness challenge to the risk clause; § 2119’s “force...or intimidation” element necessarily involves threatened physical force, so carjacking fits § 924(c)(3)(A)	Court: Affirmed—§ 924(c)(3)(B) is not unconstitutionally vague under binding precedent; carjacking qualifies under § 924(c)(3)(A)

United States v. Coleman, 78 F.3d 154 (5th Cir.) (upholding carjacking statute under Commerce Clause)
United States v. Turner, 674 F.3d 420 (5th Cir.) (affirming minimal interstate-commerce nexus for § 2119 prosecutions)
United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 670 (5th Cir. en banc) (holding crime-of-violence definitions like § 16(b) are not void for vagueness post-Johnson)
United States v. Brewer, 848 F.3d 711 (5th Cir.) (holding bank robbery’s “force...or intimidation” element meets the force-clause definition of crime of violence)
In re Smith, 829 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir.) (holding carjacking satisfies § 924(c)(3)(A))
United States v. Evans, 848 F.3d 242 (4th Cir.) (holding carjacking qualifies as a crime of violence under the force clause)
United States v. Harris, 25 F.3d 1275 (5th Cir.) (stating items ‘‘at rest’’ after interstate transport can still affect interstate commerce)
Taylor v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2074 (U.S.) (noting that a minimal or even small effect on commerce can suffice under Commerce Clause principles)