United States v. Johnson
227 F. Supp. 3d 1078
N.D. Cal.2016Background
- Marvin Johnson was convicted in 1993 on multiple counts, including four 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) counts tied to arson and witness tampering; those § 924(c) sentences (three life terms and a 20-year term) ran concurrently with other sentences.
- Johnson filed a § 2255 motion arguing the § 924(c)(3)(B) “residual clause” (crime that "by its nature, involves a substantial risk...") is unconstitutionally vague under Johnson v. United States and Dimaya.
- The Ninth Circuit in Dimaya held 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (language similar to § 924(c)(3)(B)) is void for vagueness; the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Dimaya.
- The government urged the court to follow other circuits upholding similar clauses; the District Court relied on Johnson II and Dimaya to reject that argument.
- The court found the residual clause of § 924(c)(3) void for vagueness and concluded arson (18 U.S.C. § 844(f)) and witness tampering could not be sustained under the elements clause because arson can be committed recklessly, and under Ninth Circuit precedent recklessness does not satisfy the elements clause.
- The court granted Johnson’s § 2255 petition, authorized resentencing as appropriate under the court’s broad § 2255 powers, but STAYED resentencing pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Dimaya.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause is unconstitutionally vague | Johnson: clause mirrors ACCA/§16(b) residual language invalidated in Johnson II/Dimaya, so it’s void for vagueness | Government: circuit split; some circuits hold §924(c)(3)(B) or §16(b) constitutional; Dimaya limited to INA context | Court: §924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague, Dimaya and Johnson II control; stay pending Supreme Court review |
| Procedural default of Johnson’s claim | Johnson: cause (novelty of legal basis after Johnson II/changed law) and prejudice (life terms affected) excuse default | Government: claim was defaulted on direct appeal | Court: cause and prejudice satisfied; claim not barred |
| Whether arson/witness tampering qualify under §924(c)(3)(A) elements clause | Johnson: arson (§844(f)) can be committed recklessly and elements clause requires volitional/intentional use of force; witness tampering not covered | Government: arson is a crime of violence under elements clause; (witness tampering conceded not to qualify) | Court: arson under §844(f) can be reckless and thus does not meet elements clause in light of Ninth Circuit precedent; witness tampering also does not qualify |
| Appropriate remedy and scope of relief | Johnson: §2255 permits broad resentencing relief as to all counts (unbundling the sentencing package) | Government: limited relief or reconsideration requested; procedural/timing objections | Court: grants §2255 relief, authorizes resentencing as appropriate but STAYS resentencing pending Supreme Court decision in Dimaya |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (ACCA residual clause void for vagueness)
- Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2015) (18 U.S.C. § 16(b) void for vagueness; Ninth Circuit decision later granted certiorari)
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) (elements clause requires active/volitional use of physical force; negligence insufficient)
- Fernandez‑Ruiz v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2006) (recklessness does not satisfy §16 elements clause under Ninth Circuit precedent)
- Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016) (for §921(a)(33)(A), reckless misdemeanor assaults qualify as "use" of force; Court noted but did not resolve §16 question)
- United States v. Handa, 122 F.3d 690 (9th Cir. 1997) (district court has broad resentencing authority after successful §2255 motion)