19-7071
4th Cir.Mar 16, 2022Background
- John Proctor pleaded guilty in 2004 to possession with intent to distribute cocaine base (21 U.S.C. § 841) and unlawful possession of a firearm as a felon (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)); he was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based on two drug convictions and a 1986 Maryland conviction under former Md. Art. 27 § 386 for "assault with intent to prevent lawful apprehension."
- The Supreme Court in Johnson v. United States (2015) invalidated ACCA’s residual clause, leaving only the force clause and enumerated offenses as bases for ACCA predicates. That triggered collateral review of Proctor’s ACCA enhancement.
- Proctor filed a § 2255 motion arguing § 386 does not categorically qualify as a "violent felony" under ACCA’s force clause because it can be committed by de minimis offensive contact. The district court denied relief, relying on Maryland cases showing § 386 convictions typically involved more than trivial force.
- Proctor appealed and this Court granted a certificate of appealability to decide whether § 386 is a categorical ACCA violent-felony predicate. The central question was whether the statutory elements (including intent to prevent lawful apprehension) require "violent physical force" under the categorical test.
- The Fourth Circuit applied the categorical approach, examined Maryland precedent about the common-law meaning of "assault," and concluded § 386 can be satisfied by nonviolent offensive touching; the statute’s intent element does not limit the statute to violent force.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether former Md. Art. 27 § 386 (assault with intent to prevent lawful apprehension) is a categorical "violent felony" under ACCA’s force clause | § 386 can be committed by de minimis offensive contact; thus it does not necessarily entail "violent physical force" and cannot be an ACCA predicate | § 386’s intent-to-prevent-apprehension element (and state practice) means convictions invariably involve force sufficient to overcome an apprehender, so it qualifies under the force clause | Reversed: § 386 is not categorically a violent felony because Maryland law treats "assault" to include de minimis offensive contact and the intent element does not exclude such conduct |
| Whether Maryland’s labeling of § 386 as a state "crime of violence" or the typical serious facts of § 386 prosecutions control the ACCA force-clause analysis | Labeling or typical fact patterns do not answer the federal question; federal law defines "physical force" and the categorical approach looks to the minimum conduct the statute criminalizes | The state’s characterization and the common factual record show § 386 is inherently violent and supports ACCA application | Rejected: Federal law governs the meaning of "physical force," and state labels or typical prosecutions cannot convert a statute that reaches nonviolent contact into a categorical ACCA predicate |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (invalidating ACCA’s residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (holding "physical force" in ACCA’s force clause means "violent force")
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (explaining and limiting the categorical approach and the modified categorical approach)
- Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544 (2019) (interpreting force required for robbery and explaining historical/textual limits of extending that reasoning to other offenses)
- United States v. Aparicio-Soria, 740 F.3d 152 (4th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (holding Maryland resisting-arrest is not categorically a crime of violence under the Guidelines because it can be satisfied by nonviolent offensive contact)
- United States v. Jones, 914 F.3d 893 (4th Cir. 2019) (holding a South Carolina assault-while-resisting-arrest offense was not a categorical violent felony)
- United States v. Royal, 731 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 2013) (concluding Maryland second-degree assault reaches nonviolent touching and is not an ACCA predicate)
- United States v. Middleton, 883 F.3d 485 (4th Cir. 2018) (affirming that de minimis offensive touching is not "violent force" under ACCA)
- Hall v. State, 516 A.2d 204 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (Maryland appellate decision treating § 386’s assault element as the common-law assault capable of being satisfied by minimal contact)
- McNeill v. United States, 563 U.S. 816 (2011) (directing courts to apply the law in effect at the time of the prior conviction when assessing ACCA predicates)