United States v. Joe Coleman
681 F. App'x 413
| 5th Cir. | 2017Background
- Coleman pleaded guilty (Sept. 23, 2015) to failing to register as a sex offender under SORNA, 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). He did not waive appeal rights.
- His SORNA registration obligation stemmed from a 2000 Minnesota conviction for criminal sexual conduct in the second degree (Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. (1)(a)) based on touching a 10‑year‑old girl’s legs, back, and buttocks while she slept.
- The PSR initially classified Coleman as a Tier I offender (base offense level 12, reduced to 10), yielding an 8–14 month guideline range; the government and probation later reclassified him as Tier III (base offense level 16, reduced to 15, yielding 15–21 months).
- Coleman argued the Minnesota statute is broader than the federal abusive sexual contact offense (18 U.S.C. § 2244/§ 2246(3)) because it allows conviction on ‘‘aggressive’’ rather than strictly ‘‘sexual’’ intent, so his prior conviction should not be treated as Tier III under the categorical approach.
- The district court adopted the amended PSR, sentenced Coleman to 21 months’ imprisonment and five years supervised release, and Coleman appealed; he was released from custody while the appeal was pending (Jan. 29, 2017).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Coleman) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the appeal is moot after Coleman’s release from custody | Appeal moot because custody ended | Case not moot due to collateral consequences (mandatory supervised release plus registration differences) | Not moot: collateral consequences (lifetime registration, verification frequency) preserve jurisdiction |
| Whether Minn. Stat. § 609.343(1)(a) is comparable to federal abusive sexual contact for SORNA tiering | Minnesota statute is broader because it permits conviction on ‘‘aggressive’’ (non‑sexual) intent | Statutes are nearly identical; Minnesota’s ‘‘aggressive’’ intent is comparable to federal ‘‘abuse’’ language and SORNA allows some breadth | Held comparable or more severe; Minnesota conviction qualifies as Tier III |
| Whether the categorical approach precludes treating Coleman’s conviction as Tier III | Categorical approach shows elements broader than federal offense, so cannot be used to elevate tier | SORNA permits comparison where state statute is ‘‘comparable or more severe’’; slight breadth is acceptable | Court applied categorical comparison and found elements comparable; Tier III classification upheld |
| Whether district court erred in sentencing under U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5(a) | District court misapplied Guidelines by treating prior Minnesota offense as Tier III | PSR and court correctly classified offense under § 16911(4)(A) and § 2A3.5(a) | No error; sentence affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Villanueva–Diaz, 634 F.3d 844 (5th Cir. 2011) (mootness and collateral‑consequence principles in criminal appeals)
- United States v. Lares–Meraz, 452 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 2006) (mootness and ongoing jurisdictional consequences)
- United States v. Cedillo–Narvaez, 761 F.3d 397 (5th Cir. 2014) (de novo review of guideline interpretation)
- United States v. Gonzalez–Medina, 757 F.3d 425 (5th Cir. 2014) (SORNA’s broad purpose to protect children and cast a wide net)
- United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2010) (discussion of SORNA’s scope)
- Johnson v. Pettiford, 442 F.3d 917 (5th Cir. 2006) (discretion to modify non‑mandatory supervised release)
- United States v. Spinelle, 41 F.3d 1056 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding mandatory supervision may still be modified)
- United States v. Lafayette, 585 F.3d 435 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding mandatory supervision cannot be shortened)