United States v. Jimmy Allred
942 F.3d 641
| 4th Cir. | 2019Background
- In 1995 Jimmy Lee Allred was convicted in federal court of being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)) and, under the ACCA, was sentenced to 264 months based on three predicate convictions, including a 1990 federal conviction for witness retaliation (now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b)(1)).
- ACCA defines a "violent felony" by an elements (force) clause, an enumerated clause, and a residual clause; the Supreme Court in Samuel Johnson invalidated the residual clause as unconstitutionally vague.
- After Welch made Samuel Johnson retroactive, Allred filed a § 2255 motion arguing his § 1513(b)(1) conviction no longer qualified as an ACCA predicate; the government conceded enumerated/residual clauses did not apply but argued the statute satisfied the force (elements) clause.
- The district court agreed with Allred and resentenced him to 120 months, concluding § 1513(b)(1) does not categorically constitute a "violent felony" under the force clause.
- The Fourth Circuit reversed: it held § 1513(b)(1) is divisible (so the modified categorical approach applies), Allred’s indictment charged the bodily-injury variant, and that variant—requiring knowing conduct with intent to retaliate that causes bodily injury—categorically involves the use of violent physical force and therefore qualifies under ACCA’s force clause.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is § 1513(b)(1) divisible (elements) or indivisible (means)? | Allred: indivisible—bodily injury and property damage are alternative means of one offense. | Gov’t: divisible—those alternatives are distinct elements creating separate offenses. | Divisible: the statute lists alternative elements (bodily injury vs. property damage); modified categorical approach applies. |
| Which variant did Allred plead/convict under? | Allred: (implicitly) not dispositive; focused on categorical invalidation. | Gov’t: indictment shows bodily-injury variant. | The record (indictment) charges the bodily-injury variant, so that variant is the proper focus under the modified categorical approach. |
| Does the bodily-injury variant of § 1513(b)(1) categorically qualify as a "violent felony" under ACCA’s force clause? | Allred: No—causing bodily injury can be achieved without the kind of "violent force" that ACCA requires. | Gov’t: Yes—knowing and intentional causation of bodily injury entails use of violent physical force. | Held: Yes—the statute’s requirements (knowingly engage in conduct with intent to retaliate that causes bodily injury) necessarily involve the use of violent force and therefore qualify under the ACCA elements (force) clause. |
| Does the mens rea in § 1513(b)(1) suffice to show the "use" of force for ACCA? | Allred: Possible scenarios of reckless/negligent causation mean mens rea might be insufficient. | Gov’t: The statute’s "knowingly" and "intent to retaliate" elements prevent mere recklessness; intentional causation satisfies ACCA mens rea. | Held: The heightened mens rea (knowingly + intent to retaliate) makes it unrealistic that liability would rest on mere recklessness or negligence; thus it satisfies ACCA’s "use" requirement. |
Key Cases Cited
- Samuel Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidating ACCA’s residual clause)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (holding Samuel Johnson applies retroactively on collateral review)
- Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544 (2019) (explaining post-Johnson only elements and enumerated clauses remain as ACCA channels)
- Curtis Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (defining "physical force" as "violent force" capable of causing pain or injury)
- United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157 (2014) (holding knowing/intentional causation of bodily injury involves use of physical force)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (authorizing modified categorical approach for divisible statutes)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (distinguishing elements from means; divisibility inquiry)
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) (applying the "realistic probability" limitation in categorical analysis)
- United States v. Vann, 660 F.3d 771 (4th Cir. 2011) (Fourth Circuit discussion of ACCA predicate analysis)
- United States v. Drummond, 925 F.3d 681 (4th Cir. 2019) (explaining realistic-probability constraint in categorical approach)