United States v. Jesus Rosales-Bruno
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 10346
| 11th Cir. | 2015Background
- Defendant Jesus Rosales-Bruno, a Mexican national, was deported after Florida convictions for assault/battery and false imprisonment, then illegally reentered the United States and pled guilty to illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1).
- At first sentencing the PSR applied a 16‑level § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) enhancement treating a Florida false‑imprisonment conviction as a "crime of violence," producing a guidelines range of 70–87 months; the district court sentenced him to 87 months.
- This Court (Rosales‑Bruno I) vacated that sentence, holding Florida false imprisonment was not categorically a “crime of violence” for the enhancement; the case was remanded for resentencing without the enhancement.
- On remand the corrected advisory guidelines range was 21–27 months, but the district court varied upward to the same 87‑month sentence after weighing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, emphasizing defendant’s violent prior conduct and extensive criminal history.
- The sole issue on appeal was whether the 87‑month sentence imposed on remand was substantively unreasonable under the deferential abuse‑of‑discretion standard.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Rosales‑Bruno) | Defendant's Argument (Government/District Court) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an 87‑month sentence imposed on remand (60 months above corrected guidelines) is substantively unreasonable | The district court effectively ignored the corrected guidelines (21–27 mos.) by reimposing the prior 87‑month term, giving improper weight to factors already reflected in the guidelines and failing to treat the guidelines as having "real weight" | The court properly considered the corrected guidelines plus all § 3553(a) factors and permissibly assigned greater weight to the defendant’s violent conduct and criminal history, justifying an upward variance | Affirmed: sentence not substantively unreasonable; district court acted within broad discretion after considering § 3553(a) factors |
| Whether district court impermissibly relied on the vacated § 2L1.2 enhancement or re‑sentenced as if the enhancement still applied | The upward variance simply replicated the vacated enhanced sentence, so the court in effect punished defendant for a non‑applicable enhancement | District court corrected the guidelines, considered the underlying violent facts (proper under § 3553(a)), and did not rely on the technical label needed for the now‑vacated enhancement | Held: district court may consider the factual conduct underlying prior convictions for § 3553(a) even if those convictions do not qualify for a specific guidelines enhancement |
| Whether the court gave unreasonable weight to defendant’s criminal history (category V) | The criminal history was already accounted for in the guidelines; relying on it to justify a large upward variance double‑counts and causes unwarranted disparities | A defendant’s particular criminal history and violent prior acts are legitimate § 3553(a) considerations; courts have broad leeway to weigh them and find guidelines inadequate | Held: giving substantial weight to serious, particularized criminal history was within discretion; not an abuse |
| Whether the case lies within the "heartland" of illegal reentry such that a major upward variance is unjustified | This is a run‑of‑the‑mill illegal‑reentry case; no unusual circumstances justify a tripling of the guideline ceiling | The defendant’s violent prior conduct and high criminal history category place him outside the heartland of typical illegal‑reentry offenders; those facts support a significant variance | Held: defendant falls outside the ordinary heartland; variance justified by individualized facts; sentence reasonable |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (explains deferential abuse‑of‑discretion review and that guidelines are advisory but must be considered)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (district courts may vary from guidelines; appellate review must give due deference to district court’s judgment)
- United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (Sentencing Guidelines are advisory; district courts must consider § 3553(a) factors)
- Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) (district court may disagree with Guidelines policy and vary based on § 3553(a))
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (limits evidence a sentencing court may use to establish categorical predicate offenses)
- United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2008) (vacatur where district court failed to justify major departure adequately)
- United States v. Valdes, 500 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2007) (vacated an extraordinary upward variance as inadequately justified)