United States v. Jermaine Chapman
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4308
| 5th Cir. | 2017Background
- Jeffery Perry led a Baton Rouge drug-distribution organization that used "click houses" (including 221 Evergreen St.) to cook, store, and sell cocaine/crack; associates included Jermaine Chapman and Charles Boyer. Secret compartments at Evergreen hid drugs and guns.
- Following a multi-year DEA/BRPD investigation and controlled buys, Perry, Chapman, and Boyer were indicted and tried on a 19-count second superseding indictment, including a drug conspiracy (21 U.S.C. §846) and multiple 18 U.S.C. §924(c) firearm counts.
- A jury convicted Perry, Chapman, and Boyer of the drug conspiracy; Perry was convicted on two §924(c) counts (one for discharge, one for possession-in-furtherance), Chapman on one §924(c) count; Boyer acquitted of carjacking counts.
- Post-trial motions: Chapman's and Perry’s counsel submitted a declaration asserting John West (arrested at Evergreen) told defense counsel he owned/stored the guns—Perry and Chapman moved for new trial based on that allegedly new evidence; district court denied without hearing.
- At sentencing, government argued Count 10 was a "second" §924(c) conviction triggering the 25-year mandatory minimum under §924(c)(1)(C)(i); district court refused to apply the 25-year term because it could not determine which §924(c) verdict the jury reached first and applied the rule of lenity to avoid enhancement.
- Fifth Circuit affirmed convictions and denials of severance/new-trial motions, but vacated and remanded for resentencing on Perry’s §924(c) counts, directing sequencing that minimizes defendant’s aggregate mandatory minima (i.e., treat five-year count first, then apply 25-year enhanced minimum to the other count).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court erred by not applying §924(c)(1)(C)(i) 25-year mandatory minimum to Perry’s second §924(c) conviction | Gov’t: Deal controls; multiple §924(c) convictions in same proceeding produce a first and second conviction; court must apply the 25-year enhanced minimum to the second conviction | Perry: Court permissibly declined enhancement because jury deliberation order is unknown and §924(c) ambiguous; relied on lenity and argued vagueness of §924(c)(3)(B) | Reversed in part: court erred; adopt sister-circuit approach under lenity — treat the §924(c) count with the lowest mandatory minimum as the first conviction (here Count 10 five years; Count 6 becomes second with 25-year minimum); remand for recalculation |
| Sufficiency of evidence for conspiracy (Perry) | Gov’t: Evidence (co-conspirator testimony, controlled buys, secret compartments, joint trips, credit sales, video) shows agreement, intent, and concert of action supporting §846 conviction | Perry: Transactions show only buyer-seller relationships, not a conspiracy | Affirmed: Evidence sufficient when viewed in light most favorable to verdict; personnel changes and buyer-seller contentions insufficient to negate conspiracy inference |
| Sufficiency of evidence for conspiracy (Boyer) | Gov’t: Testimony that Boyer lived at a click house, handled/weighed drugs, sold drugs, stored guns, and aided robberies shows active participation and specific intent | Boyer: Role was minor/"errand boy" and lacked specific intent | Affirmed: Even minor roles with knowledge and voluntary participation suffice; specific intent can be inferred from probable consequences of conduct |
| Motion to sever / unfair prejudice (Boyer) | Gov’t: Joint trial proper; limiting instructions adequate; no specific prejudice shown | Boyer: Tried with more culpable co-defendants, leading to spillover and prejudice; requested severance | Affirmed: Denial of severance not an abuse of discretion—generalized spillover claim insufficient; jury instructions and verdict pattern undermine claimed prejudice |
| Motions for new trial based on newly discovered evidence (Chapman, Boyer) | Chapman/Boyer: Defense counsel’s declaration relaying West’s alleged statement that West owned/stored guns is newly discovered and would probably produce acquittal on Count 10 | Gov’t: Evidence is hearsay, not shown to be newly discovered or material, and even if believed would not probably produce acquittal because it implicates Pinkerton liability and does not exonerate Chapman/Boyer | Affirmed: District court did not abuse discretion; Chapman’s proffer fails diligence and admissibility/materiality requirements and would not likely lead to acquittal; Boyer’s claim repeats severance/spillover argument and fails on the merits |
Key Cases Cited
- Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129 (statute’s "second or subsequent" §924(c) enhancement applies when multiple §924(c) convictions occur in the same proceeding)
- United States v. Kaluza, 780 F.3d 647 (5th Cir.) (rule of lenity principle for ambiguous criminal statutes)
- United States v. Major, 676 F.3d 803 (9th Cir.) (when jury order unknown, sequence convictions to minimize mandatory minima under rule of lenity)
- United States v. Pierce, 785 F.3d 832 (2d Cir.) (rule of lenity applied to sequence §924(c) convictions to minimize sentence)
- Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (co-conspirator liability for foreseeable substantive crimes committed in furtherance of conspiracy)
- United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 670 (5th Cir. en banc) (rejected vagueness challenge to a similar "risk of force" definition)