United States v. Jason Fletcher, 978 F.3d 1009

Background

Fletcher was on probation for a 2013 conviction for importuning a minor; his probation forbade contact with minors, possession of pornography, and included a clause consenting to warrantless searches of his person, motor vehicle, or residence by a probation officer.
At a routine probation meeting an officer observed Fletcher carrying two cell phones, announced he would search them, and Fletcher responded nervously, claimed not to remember a passcode, and appeared to try to access one phone.
The officer took one phone, used Fletcher’s fingerprint to unlock it, and immediately observed an image of child pornography; the officer seized the phone and called a detective, who obtained a warrant and searched the phone further.
The phone contained downloaded child pornography and videos filmed on the phone showing sexual abuse; state charges for pandering resulted in a guilty plea and 10-year sentence; federal charges for production and conspiracy led to a bench conviction and a 35-year sentence.
Fletcher moved to suppress the phone evidence; the district court denied suppression. The Sixth Circuit majority held the warrantless search was unreasonable, applied the exclusionary rule, reversed the denial of suppression, vacated the conviction and sentence, and remanded. A dissent would have affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Fletcher's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether the probation officer had reasonable suspicion to search the phone without a warrant	No—possession of two phones and Fletcher’s nervousness did not give a particularized, objective basis to suspect a probation violation or crime	Yes—Fletcher’s status as a sex-offender probationer, two phones, furtive movement, passcode denial, and attempt to delete support reasonable suspicion	No reasonable suspicion; the officer’s announcement created any exigency and the search was unreasonable
Whether Fletcher’s probation terms authorized searching a cell phone	No—the written terms authorized searches of person, vehicle, or residence, but did not clearly or unambiguously include cell phones	Yes—the search was within the probation-search clause; any reasonable mistake about scope should suffice	The terms did not clearly authorize cell-phone searches; Riley treats phones as distinct, so the clause did not justify the search
Whether Riley and related Fourth Amendment principles permit the warrantless search under exceptions (exigency, officer safety, destruction of evidence)	Riley requires a warrant for phone content; no true exigency existed and any exigency was created by the officer	The officer faced risk of destruction of evidence and safety concerns and reasonably relied on probation authority	Riley limits warrantless phone searches; securing the phone would prevent deletion and officers should obtain a warrant; no exception applied here
Whether the exclusionary rule should bar use of evidence or the good-faith/warrant exception applies	Exclusionary rule applies because the officer’s conduct was deliberate and not objectively reasonable; subsequent warrant relied on tainted search	Good-faith exception applies because the detective reasonably relied on the probation officer’s search and then obtained a warrant	Exclusionary rule applies; McClain/Leon good-faith exception does not rescue the warrant because the warrant was based on the illegal initial search and reliance was not objectively reasonable

Key Cases Cited

Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) (cell-phone searches generally require a warrant; digital data merits heightened privacy protection)
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (framework for warrantless searches under statutes/regulations for probationers)
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) (balancing privacy diminished by probation against governmental interests)
Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011) (police may not create exigency by unlawful conduct to justify warrantless entry/search)
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (scope and purpose of the exclusionary rule; deters deliberate/reckless misconduct)
United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2015) (applying Riley’s balancing to searches involving digital devices)
United States v. Tessier, 814 F.3d 432 (6th Cir. 2016) (probation terms that clearly and unambiguously authorize searches can permit suspicionless searches)
United States v. McClain, 444 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 2006) (discussing application of Leon good-faith exception when a warrant relies on evidence obtained in a prior questionable search)
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (good-faith exception to exclusionary rule when officers reasonably rely on a magistrate-issued warrant)