United States v. Jamaal Robertson
736 F.3d 677
4th Cir.2013Background
- Police responded to a reported foot chase involving a gun in a high-crime neighborhood; multiple officers converged near a bus shelter at night.
- Six to seven people were in the bus shelter; several were being detained or "handled" by other officers.
- Officer Doug Welch approached Jamaal Robertson (seated, back to shelter wall, blocked on three sides by walls and officers) and asked if he had anything illegal.
- Robertson remained silent; Welch gestured/waved Robertson forward and asked to search him. Robertson stood, came forward, turned, and raised his hands; Welch recovered a firearm.
- Robertson, a convicted felon, was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and moved to suppress the firearm as the product of an unlawful search; the district court denied suppression.
- The Fourth Circuit (majority) reversed, holding Robertson’s submission was acquiescence to a command, not voluntary consent; a dissent would have deferred to the district court’s credibility-based finding of consent.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Robertson) | Defendant's Argument (Government/Officer) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Robertson voluntarily consented to the search | Robertson contends he merely obeyed an officer’s command (begrudging submission), not voluntary consent; thus search was unreasonable without probable cause | Officer Welch contends Robertson consented by approaching, turning, and raising hands after being asked if he mind a search | Reversed: Court held government failed to prove voluntary consent; submission to a police command in a police-dominated, accusatory setting was not consent |
| Standard of review / deference to district court findings | Robertson emphasizes facts (as credited by district court) show no consent; appellate court may review facts but must apply clear-error/deference | Government argues district court credibility findings (Officer credible, Robertson not) are plausible and should be sustained under clearly-erroneous standard | Majority applied facts from officer’s testimony and concluded even under those facts consent was not shown; dissent argued this court should defer to district court’s plausible credibility findings and affirm |
Key Cases Cited
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent obviates need for probable cause; voluntariness is judged under totality of circumstances)
- United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542 (4th Cir. 1998) (construe facts in light most favorable to government on suppression appeals)
- United States v. Wilson, 895 F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1990) (clear-error review of district court’s consensual-search finding; subjective totality-of-circumstances test)
- United States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647 (4th Cir. 1996) (factors relevant to consent include number of officers and whether subject informed of right to refuse)
- United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (government bears burden of proving consent)
- Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) (consent cannot be mere acquiescence to asserted lawful authority)
- United States v. Elie, 111 F.3d 1135 (4th Cir. 1997) (friendly, voluntary interactions support consent)
- United States v. Albrektsen, 151 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 1998) (submission to avoid force does not equal consent)
- Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985) (appellate court must defer to district court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous)