964 F.3d 864
9th Cir.2020Background:
- Voris, a convicted felon, fired one shot out the motel room back window at Officer Garcia and then fired four shots toward the front door where five U.S. Marshals (a five-person "stack" plus others nearby) were positioned.
- No officers were hit; Voris surrendered after negotiations and later admitted shooting at the marshals.
- Grand jury charged him with nine counts of assault on a federal officer (18 U.S.C. § 111), nine counts of discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)), and one count of being a prohibited possessor (18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), 924(a)(2)).
- Jury convicted Voris of six § 111 counts, six § 924(c) counts, and one § 922(g) count; district court sentenced him to 1,750 months (approx. 146 years), including multiple consecutive § 924(c) terms (one 10-year and five 25-year consecutive terms).
- On appeal Voris argued (1) multiplicity of five assault convictions based on the four front-door shots, (2) multiplicity of five § 924(c) convictions tied to those assaults, (3) entitlement to resentencing under § 403 of the First Step Act, and (4) district court abused discretion in denying mistrial/new trial after an officer mentioned Voris’s "criminal history."
Issues:
| Issue | Voris’s Argument | Government’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether five § 111 assault convictions (based on four front-door shots) are multiplicitous | The four shots were one continuous act or otherwise do not support five distinct assault convictions; Ladner limits convictions to one per shot | § 111 convictions may be based on separate assaultive acts; four shots can support four convictions | Reversed one § 111 conviction; four convictions stand (one multiplicitous conviction vacated) |
| Whether five § 924(c) convictions (predicated on the five assaults) are multiplicitous | § 924(c) requires a separate firearm "use" for each conviction, so the server should be limited where firearm was used once | § 924(c) applies to each discharge/use; separate predicate offenses can support separate § 924(c) counts | Reversed one § 924(c) conviction (vacated along with the vacated § 111); remaining § 924(c) convictions affirmed |
| Whether Voris is entitled to resentencing under First Step Act § 403 | § 403 should apply because his convictions/sentencing were pending on appeal when the Act enacted | § 403(b) applies only where a sentence has not yet been "imposed" as of enactment; Voris was already sentenced | Held § 403 does not apply; statute applies only if sentence had not been imposed at enactment, so no resentencing |
| Whether district court abused discretion by denying mistrial/new trial after officer’s reference to Voris’s "criminal history" | The remark was prejudicial character evidence requiring mistrial or new trial | Remark was brief/vague, jurors already knew Voris was a felon, government mitigated prejudice, evidence against Voris was strong | No abuse of discretion; motions denied properly (prejudice minimal) |
Key Cases Cited
- Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169 (1958) (one gunshot supports only one assault under predecessor to § 111; rule of lenity)
- United States v. Chilaca, 909 F.3d 289 (9th Cir. 2018) (multiplicity remedy is vacatur of multiplicitous convictions and resentencing)
- United States v. Andrews, 75 F.3d 552 (9th Cir. 1996) (multiple § 924(c) convictions allowed when supported by distinct, properly charged predicate offenses)
- Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995) (firing a firearm constitutes "use")
- Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129 (1993) (application of mandatory consecutive 25-year enhancement to "second or subsequent" § 924(c) convictions)
- United States v. Monks, 774 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1985) (denial of mistrial affirmed where prejudice from improper testimony was minimal)
- United States v. Smith, 924 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1991) (each § 924(c) count must be supported by a separate predicate offense)
