United States v. Holloway
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 1252
| 1st Cir. | 2011Background
- Holloway was convicted of being a felon in possession of ammunition; he had three prior Massachusetts convictions for assault and battery, each with indictments stating he "did assault and beat" the victim.
- Calvo faced a similar posture: three prior Massachusetts assault-and-battery convictions, each with indictments using the boilerplate "did assault and beat."
- At sentencing, the government sought ACCA-enhanced punishment based on those three predicates; district court referred to Mangos to treat the boilerplate language as identifying harmful battery.
- This court previously upheld Mangos on several occasions, treating the charging language as sufficient to identify harmful battery; Holloway was sentenced to time served on remand the first time.
- On remand, Holloway and Calvo were again sentenced to the ACCA mandatory term, but the panel revisits Mangos in light of Johnson v. United States (2010) and concludes the boilerplate language is no longer controlling.
- The court vacates the sentences and remands for resentencing, requiring district courts to examine the underlying battery offense (via Shepard materials) to determine if the conviction qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Johnson undermine Mangos’ boilerplate rule? | Holloway: Johnson requires state-law interpretation, not a panel’s gloss. | Calvo: same, Johnson undermines relying on boilerplate language. | Yes; Mangos rule rejected; Johnson requires state-law construction and identification of the specific offense. |
| Can the Massachusetts simple assault and battery statute serve as a violent felony under the ACCA? | The indictment language suffices to identify harmful battery as the conviction. | Indictments are boilerplate; cannot identify the specific battery without further documents. | No; because the statute covers multiple offenses, one must identify the actual battery type; reckless/offensive battery do not categorically satisfy force or residual clauses. |
| Does the residual clause of the ACCA apply to these convictions? | Convictions and charging language may suffice to show a risk of physical injury under § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). | Reckless battery is not typically a violent felony; the conviction cannot rely on residual clause alone. | Rejected as to automatic reliance; the district court must use Shepard materials to assess if the offense falls within the residual clause, and the government may pursue on remand both force and residual theories. |
| What is the proper course on remand? | Allow both force and residual-clause theories with Shepard materials. | Limit the remand to the identified offense without double-proffering. | Remand permitted with opportunity to present Shepard-based materials for either theory. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Mangos, 134 F.3d 460 (1st Cir. 1998) (boilerplate 'did assault and beat' sufficed to identify harmful battery)
- United States v. Rivera, 562 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2009) (confirms addressing charging language in sentencing under ACCA)
- United States v. Holloway, 499 F.3d 114 (1st Cir. 2007) (rejected blanket reliance on boilerplate to identify harmful battery)
- United States v. Estevez, 419 F.3d 77 (1st Cir. 2005) (discusses violent felonies and battery offenses under ACCA)
- United States v. Santos, 363 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2004) (early treatment of batteries under ACCA context)
- Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265 (2010) (held Florida battery lacked the force-clause element; state-law construction crucial)
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008) (defines 'similar in kind' standard for residual clause)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (limits use of documents outside the record to identify the offense of conviction)
- Giggey, 589 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2009) (guides use of residual clauses and documentation in ACCA analysis)