United States v. Hill
225 F. Supp. 3d 328
W.D. Pa.2016Background
- Hill was convicted in federal court for being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)) and sentenced to 60 months after the district court varied downward from an advisory range that was increased by a 6-level Guidelines enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A).
- The § 2K2.1 enhancement was applied because Hill had prior Pennsylvania convictions listed in the PSR: simple assault (18 Pa. C.S. § 2701(a)(1)) and recklessly endangering another person (18 Pa. C.S. § 2705), which the PSR characterized as "crimes of violence."
- Hill did not object at sentencing to the Guidelines calculation but later filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion after Johnson v. United States (invalidating ACCA’s residual clause), arguing the identical "residual clause" in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) is void and therefore the § 2K2.1 enhancement is unconstitutional.
- The Government opposed on procedural grounds and argued Hill’s simple assault conviction still qualifies as a "crime of violence" under the elements/force clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1), relying on recent Supreme Court decisions (Castleman, Voisine).
- The Court (citing its Stanton decision and Third Circuit precedent) held that: (1) the residual clause of § 4B1.2(a)(2) is unconstitutional and that invalidation is a substantive rule applied retroactively on collateral review; and (2) Pennsylvania simple assault § 2701(a)(1) is not categorically a "crime of violence" under the elements/force clause.
- The Court granted Hill’s § 2255 motion, vacated the sentence, explained the § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) enhancement is inapplicable, and set the case for resentencing (noting possible time-served relief given time served and sentencing-range recalculation).
Issues
| Issue | Hill's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the invalidation of § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause is a substantive rule applying retroactively on collateral review | Johnson/Welch principles make the Guidelines residual-clause invalidation substantive and retroactive; § 2255 timely filed | Residual-clause invalidation is not necessarily a substantive rule for the advisory Guidelines; procedural defenses (timeliness/default) bar relief | The court held the invalidation is a substantive rule and applies retroactively; Hill's § 2255 was timely and not procedurally defaulted |
| Whether Hill’s Pennsylvania simple assault conviction (§ 2701(a)(1)) is a categorical "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1) (elements/force clause) | § 2701(a)(1) is indivisible and covers reckless conduct; Third Circuit precedent holds reckless assaults are not covered, so it is not a categorical crime of violence | Reliance on Castleman and Voisine suggests reckless conduct can qualify as "use of force," so § 2701(a)(1) can qualify | The court held § 2701(a)(1) is not a categorical crime of violence under the elements/force clause and Castleman/Voisine do not overrule Third Circuit precedent here |
| Whether the § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) six-level enhancement can stand given the residual-clause ruling | Enhancement invalid because predicates no longer qualify; without it Hill’s base offense level is lower | Enhancement should stand because at sentencing courts relied on existing precedent and factual predicates | The court vacated the enhancement (inapplicable now) and concluded Hill was prejudiced; resentencing required |
| Whether Hill’s later state convictions (2009) affect resentencing (criminal history or predicate status) | Later state convictions occurred after the federal offense and thus cannot be predicates under § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A); adding criminal history points at resentencing could occur but would not prevent prompt release | Government argued those convictions may be counted as prior sentences at resentencing for criminal history | The court held the 2009 convictions cannot serve as predicates for § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) but may be counted as "prior sentence(s)" for criminal history at a de novo resentencing; recalculations still permit likely time-served outcome |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (ACCA residual clause void for vagueness)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (Johnson announced a substantive rule retroactive on collateral review)
- Calabretta v. United States, 831 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 2016) (Third Circuit held § 4B1.2 residual clause unconstitutionally vague)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (distinguishing divisible statutes and the categorical/modified categorical approaches)
- Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338 (2016) (guidelines-range error can show reasonable probability of different outcome)
- Castleman v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) (interpreting "physical force" in § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) more broadly than Johnson)
- Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016) (reckless misdemeanor domestic violence can qualify under § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii))
- United States v. Otero, 502 F.3d 331 (3d Cir. 2007) (Third Circuit held Pennsylvania simple assault does not categorically require use of force)
- United States v. Doe, 810 F.3d 132 (3d Cir. 2015) (Third Circuit precedent that simple assault with reckless mens rea is not a crime of violence under the Guidelines)
- United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2006) (sentencing procedures to compute and consider Guidelines range)