United States v. Hill
832 F.3d 135
| 2d Cir. | 2016Background
- In 1997 Fredy Cuenca, a New York livery driver, was robbed and fatally shot after two passengers (Rhan Powell and Elvin Hill) rode in his cab; Powell later identified Hill as the shooter.
- Powell testified to a grand jury in 2011; Hill was indicted in 2012 and tried in the Eastern District of New York.
- Hill was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j)(1) for causing death by firearm in the course of a Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951), which the indictment treated as a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3).
- Hill appealed, arguing (1) Hobbs Act robbery is not categorically a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A) (the force clause), chiefly because ‘‘fear of injury’’ can be non‑physical, and (2) § 924(c)(3)(B) (the risk‑of‑force clause) is void for vagueness in light of Johnson v. United States (2015).
- The Second Circuit considered the categorical approach, analyzed Hobbs Act robbery’s statutory elements (including "actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury"), and reviewed Supreme Court precedent on the meaning of "physical force."
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (U.S./Prosecution) | Defendant's Argument (Hill) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hobbs Act robbery is categorically a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A) (force clause) | Hobbs Act robbery's statutory elements (force, threatened force, fear of injury) encompass uses/threats of physical force and thus satisfy § 924(c)(3)(A). | Hobbs Act robbery can be committed by creating fear of non‑physical or non‑violent injury (e.g., economic or property nuisances), so its minimum conduct may lack the statutory "use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force." | The court held Hobbs Act robbery is categorically a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A). |
| Whether threats that cause fear of injury by indirect or non‑kinetic means (e.g., poisoning, withholding medicine, economic threats) are "use or threatened use of physical force" | Indirect uses or threats that can cause physical harm (e.g., poisoning) or threats that reasonably imply force fall within "physical force"; Castleman supports indirect application. | Such indirect or non‑kinetic threats do not amount to threatened "physical force" as required by the statute. | The court held indirect threats that reasonably involve force (or its threat) satisfy the force clause; hypotheticals do not show a realistic probability Hobbs Act robbery encompasses only non‑forceful conduct. |
| Whether § 924(c)(3)(B) (risk‑of‑force clause) is unconstitutionally vague post‑Johnson (2015) | § 924(c)(3)(B) is materially narrower and conceptually distinct from the ACCA residual clause invalidated in Johnson; it does not contain the same list/"otherwise" formulation, so it is not void for vagueness. | Johnson II’s reasoning renders any residual/risk‑of‑force clause unconstitutionally vague, including § 924(c)(3)(B). | The court held § 924(c)(3)(B) is not unconstitutionally vague and rejected Hill’s Johnson‑based vagueness argument. |
| Whether the conviction should be vacated on the challenged statutory grounds | The Hobbs Act predicate qualifies under either clause; Johnson II does not void § 924(c)(3)(B). | Conviction rests on an invalid predicate because Hobbs Act robbery is not a categorical crime of violence and/or § 924(c)(3)(B) is vague. | Judgment affirmed; conviction stands. |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (Sup. Ct.) (articulates the categorical approach)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (Sup. Ct.) (construed "physical force" for ACCA; significance to § 924 discussed)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (Sup. Ct.) (held ACCA residual clause void for vagueness; central to Hill’s vagueness argument)
- Castleman v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (Sup. Ct.) (physical force can encompass indirect application, e.g., poisoning)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (Sup. Ct.) (categorical/modified‑categorical approach guidance)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (Sup. Ct.) (further guidance on categorical approach)
- Gonzales v. Duenas‑Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (Sup. Ct.) (realistic‑probability requirement for categorical approach)
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (Sup. Ct.) (construing risk language similar to § 924(c)(3)(B))
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (Sup. Ct.) (limits on legal imagination under categorical approach)