185 F. Supp. 3d 114
D.D.C.2016Background
- Vernon Hawkins pled guilty (Aug 13, 2013) to one count of making a false statement in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 for lying to FBI agents about arranging for a witness ("Person One") to leave town during an FBI investigation of a 2010 GOTV effort.
- Plea agreement preserved the parties’ right to litigate which Sentencing Guidelines provision controls base offense level.
- U.S. Probation and the Government recommended a base offense level of 14 (applying the obstruction guideline via U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(c)(3) → § 2J1.2); Hawkins argued for base level 6 under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(a)(2).
- Two sentencing adjustments were disputed: a +2 obstruction enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (based on alleged post‑plea false statements about a $10,000 cash payment) and a −2 acceptance‑of‑responsibility reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a).
- The Court concluded it may consider offense conduct contained in both the Information and the Statement of the Offense (stipulated facts) to determine whether § 2B1.1(c)(3) cross‑references § 2J1.2; it found the Information alone establishes a § 1512(b)(3) violation and the stipulated facts establish violations of §§ 1503 and 1512(c)(2).
- Court held the cross‑reference applies and set base offense level at 14, but reserved rulings on the § 3C1.1 upward adjustment and § 3E1.1 downward adjustment pending resolution of factual disputes at sentencing (notably involvement in the $10,000 payment and whether later statements reflect willful obstruction versus memory deficits).
Issues
| Issue | Government's Argument | Hawkins's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether court may consider stipulated offense conduct beyond the charging document when applying U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(c)(3) cross‑reference | Court may consider offense conduct in the Information and the Statement of the Offense (stipulated facts) related to the conviction | Cross‑reference is limited to the four corners of the charging document (Information) | Court: may consider both the Information and stipulated Statement of the Offense (limited to offense conduct, not all relevant conduct) |
| Whether conduct establishes an offense covered by Chapter Two (obstruction guideline § 2J1.2) so cross‑reference applies | Conduct (Information alone and supplemented by stipulation) meets elements of obstruction statutes (§§ 1512(b)(3); with stipulation also §§ 1503 and 1512(c)(2)) | Argues statutes don’t apply because requirements (third‑party misleading, nexus to grand jury, corrupt intent) not met | Court: even the Information alone establishes § 1512(b)(3); with stipulated facts §§ 1503 and 1512(c)(2) also satisfied → cross‑reference applies; base level = 14 |
| Whether a two‑level upward adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 is warranted for post‑plea obstructive conduct (statements about $10,000 payment) | Seeks +2 enhancement based on post‑plea false statements that materially impeded the investigation; government to prove facts by preponderance | Hawkins attributes inconsistent recall to diagnosed memory deficits and contests witnesses supporting the payment allegation | Court reserved decision to sentencing to resolve factual disputes by a preponderance (involvement in payment; whether statements were willfully obstructive) |
| Whether Hawkins is entitled to a two‑level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) | Opposes reduction: argues Hawkins denied/minimized conduct and made post‑plea false statements; obstruction conduct ordinarily contradicts acceptance | Argues plea and expressed remorse justify the reduction | Court reserved decision to sentencing; will determine whether Hawkins clearly accepted responsibility or if obstructive conduct precludes the reduction |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Genoa, 343 F.3d 578 (2d Cir.) (discusses scope of § 2B1.1(c)(3) after Amendment 617)
- United States v. Bah, 439 F.3d 423 (8th Cir.) (reads § 2B1.1(c)(3) to limit inquiry to the indictment’s count of conviction)
- United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995) (mens rea/nexus requirement for § 1503 obstruction convictions)
- Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005) (on knowingly corrupt persuasion in obstruction contexts)
- In re Sealed Case, 162 F.3d 670 (D.C. Cir.) (definition and scope of obstruction under § 1503)
- United States v. Veal, 153 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir.) (elements of § 1512(b)(3) and meaning of "another person")
- United States v. Pasha, 797 F.3d 1122 (D.C. Cir.) (standard for corrupt intent under § 1503)
- United States v. Price, 409 F.3d 436 (D.C. Cir.) (government’s burden to prove sentencing facts by preponderance)