374 F. Supp. 3d 628
E.D. Ky.2019Background
- Timothy Havens pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute ≥50g methamphetamine at a Rule 11 hearing on October 4, 2018; the district court formally adjudged him guilty on October 23, 2018.
- The First Step Act of 2018 was enacted December 21, 2018; Title IV amended 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (the "safety valve") to broaden eligibility for relief from certain mandatory minimums.
- Under the pre-Act § 3553(f), Havens (with multiple criminal history points) did not qualify; under the amended § 3553(f) he would qualify.
- The sole disputed legal question: whether § 402(b) of the First Step Act ("the amendments ... shall apply only to a conviction entered on or after the date of enactment") covers defendants who were adjudged guilty before enactment but sentenced after.
- The parties agreed Havens meets the amended statutory criteria; the government argued the amendment should apply, Havens urged its application, and the court was asked to resolve the meaning of "conviction entered."
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether "conviction entered" in § 402(b) means the finding of guilt (plea/ verdict) or the later entry of judgment/sentence | (United States) The phrase should be read as "entry of judgment" so the amendments apply to cases not yet sentenced on enactment | (Havens) The amendments apply because judgment had not yet been entered and sentencing occurred after enactment | Court: "conviction entered" refers to pronouncement/finding of guilt (the adjudication), not the later judgment entry; thus § 402(b) does not apply to pleas entered before enactment |
Key Cases Cited
- Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560 (2012) (undefined statutory terms receive their ordinary meaning in context)
- Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129 (1993) ("conviction" can mean either finding of guilt or final judgment; must read word in context)
- Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012) (analyzing congressional intent for applying more lenient sentencing provisions to pre-Act offenders)
- Keeley v. Whitaker, 910 F.3d 878 (6th Cir. 2018) (statutory terms interpreted in their ordinary contemporaneous meaning and context)