United States v. Havelock
664 F.3d 1284
9th Cir.2012Background
- Havelock mailed six threatening-communication envelopes around Super Bowl XLII to media outlets and websites the day of the event.
- Manifesto materials inside the packets contained broad, postmortem and future-threatening language but no explicit per-letter addressee identified in the outer envelope.
- District court held § 876(c) addressed to natural persons and allowed considering contents to identify addressees; jury convicted on six counts.
- Panel of Ninth Circuit reversed on interpretation of § 876(c); en banc review granted to resolve whether ‘person’ in § 876(c) is limited to natural persons and whether contents may identify addressees.
- Majority held ‘person’ in § 876(c) is limited to natural persons; allowed examining envelope, salutation, and contents to identify addressee; convictions reversed and acquittal entered.
- Concurrences and dissents debated whether the majority’s content-based approach is proper and whether § 876(c) can reach corporations or mass-audience targets.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does § 876(c) apply to corporations or only natural persons? | Havelock argues § 876(c) covers only natural persons. | Havelock contends addressing to entities is possible; majority adopts narrower reading. | Natural-person interpretation adopted in majority; § 876(c) limited to natural persons. |
| May a court consider the contents of a communication to identify the addressee under § 876(c)? | Content may reveal addressee beyond envelope/salutation. | Contents should not be used to extend addressee beyond the envelope where appropriate. | Court may consult envelope, salutation, and contents to determine addressee. |
| Were Havelock’s communications addressed to natural persons under § 876(c)? | Manifesto targeted media personnel and readers; addressees could be natural persons. | Manifesto addressed to outlets; may not identify a natural-person addressee. | Convictions reversed; not addressed to natural persons under § 876(c). |
| Did the government prove the requisite specific intent to threaten under § 876(c)? | Twine requires specific intent to threaten; evidence showed intent to threaten future harm. | Manifesto was retrospective and not a true threat; no specific intent proven. | Issue treated in concurrence/dissent; majority reversal on addressee issue; specific-intent question reserved in dissent. |
Key Cases Cited
- Rowland v. California Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194 (1993) (context-defines dictionary Act's ‘person’ meaning)
- Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115 (1994) (uniformity presumption in statutory language)
- United States v. Williams, 376 F.3d 1048 (10th Cir. 2004) (encompasses envelope/salutation in addressing addressee)
- United States v. Rendelman, 641 F.3d 36 (4th Cir. 2011) (contents can determine addressee for § 876(c) enhancement/target)
- Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (true threats exceptional First Amendment doctrine)