United States v. Guerrero-Navarro
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 24906
5th Cir.2013Background
- Guerrero-Navarro pleaded guilty in federal court to unlawful reentry and unlawful possession of a firearm; the district court applied a Guidelines enhancement under USSG §2L1.2(b)(1)(A) based on a prior Washington Residential Burglary conviction characterized as a "crime of violence."
- The enhancement turns on whether the Washington statute criminalizes the enumerated generic offense "burglary of a dwelling" (USSG §4B1.2(a)).
- Washington defines Residential Burglary as unlawful entry or remaining in a "dwelling" with intent to commit a crime; "dwelling" is defined as any building or structure "used or ordinarily used by a person for lodging," while "building" has a broad, general-code definition.
- Guerrero-Navarro argued the statute is overbroad because the definitions could encompass fenced areas, cargo containers, or other places that do not meet the generic definition of burglary of a dwelling under Taylor.
- The government and the district court relied on the statutory limiting phrase "used or ordinarily used for lodging" and Washington appellate decisions which have treated dwellings as traditional inhabitable structures (vacant houses, trailers, garages, etc.).
- The Fifth Circuit reviewed de novo and held the Washington Residential Burglary statute is not overbroad and qualifies as generic burglary of a dwelling for sentencing enhancement purposes.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Guerrero-Navarro) | Defendant's Argument (Government / District Court) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Wash. Rev. Code §9A.52.025 (Residential Burglary) categorically matches the generic offense "burglary of a dwelling" for USSG §2L1.2 enhancement | Statutory definitions of "dwelling" and "building" are overbroad and could include fenced areas, cargo containers, or other non-dwelling structures | The statute’s phrase "used or ordinarily used for lodging" limits "dwelling" to places used for human habitation; Washington case law supports a conventional reading | The statute is not overbroad; conviction qualifies as burglary of a dwelling and supports the enhancement |
| Whether there is a "realistic probability" Washington courts would apply the statute to non-dwelling structures (Duenas‑Alvarez standard) | Points to broad statutory language as permitting non-dwelling applications | No Washington appellate decisions apply the statute to the proffered non-dwelling examples; jury instructions and case law show courts treat "dwelling" in the ordinary, habitation-focused sense | No realistic probability shown; Duenas‑Alvarez burden unmet; statute aligns with the generic dwelling burglary definition |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (establishes categorical approach to define generic burglary)
- Gonzales v. Duenas‑Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (requires a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, to show state statute is overbroad)
- United States v. Castillo‑Morales, 507 F.3d 873 (defines dwelling to include structures, tents, or vessels where someone lives)
- United States v. Murillo‑Lopez, 444 F.3d 337 (Fifth Circuit on categorical approach and common‑sense analysis)
- James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (illustrates overbreadth examples relevant to burglary analysis)
- United States v. Wenner, 351 F.3d 969 (Ninth Circuit decision reaching the opposite conclusion on Washington’s statute)