United States v. Gregory Sitzmann
893 F.3d 811
| D.C. Cir. | 2018Background
- Gregory Sitzmann was convicted by a jury after a 23-day trial of conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 5+ kg of cocaine (21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846) based on a long-running international trafficking conspiracy (circa 1990–2004).
- Government proof included recorded conversations, co‑conspirator testimony (including cooperating witness Colligan), physical and documentary evidence, expert testimony, and Sitzmann's admissions (including a 2008 interview and a 2004 France arrest for cocaine).
- A contested wire transfer from Florida to Washington, D.C. (arranged by the government informant to induce Jones to pay Colligan) formed the basis for venue in D.C.; defense alleged the government "manufactured venue."
- Defense also raised Brady/Giglio and Napue claims (non‑production of grand jury testimony and alleged presentation of false testimony), and objected post‑trial to the prosecution’s reference to non‑testifying co‑conspirator George Jones’ guilty plea.
- District Court denied motions for acquittal/new trial and denied relief on Brady/Napue claims; sentenced Sitzmann to 348 months. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed on all issues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Sitzmann) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Extraterritoriality of §§841/846 | Statutes do not clearly apply abroad; evidence of foreign conduct (e.g., France) is outside court's jurisdiction | Statutes lack clear extraterritorial language but conspiracy’s focal conduct occurred in U.S., so domestic application is permissible | Held: Presumption against extraterritoriality not rebutted, but second‑step focus test satisfied — domestic application valid because relevant conduct occurred in U.S. (affirmed) |
| Manufactured venue / venue entrapment | D.C. prosecution improperly "manufactured venue" by orchestrating Jones’ wire to D.C.; due process violated | Even if concept existed, record shows Jones willingly wired funds; overt acts occurred in many districts so venue in D.C. is fair | Held: Court declined to adopt manufactured‑venue doctrine here and found no such abuse; venue proper in D.C. (affirmed) |
| Jury decision on venue | Venue was a factual question for the jury; trial court erred by telling jury venue was a legal issue and already decided | Defendant failed to timely object during prosecution’s case; Haire test not met; mid‑trial consent to instruction waived jury issue | Held: Venue was for court as matter of law—defense forfeited right to jury instruction; no error (affirmed) |
| Brady / Giglio and Napue claims (nondisclosure & false testimony) | Government failed to produce Jones’ grand jury testimony before trial and knowingly presented false/misleading testimony (Officer Buss) | Jones’ grand jury testimony did not materially favor or contradict prosecution witnesses; Buss’ isolated characterization was not shown to be known false and was not prejudicial given overwhelming evidence | Held: No Brady/Giglio or Napue violation; any inconsistencies were not materially favorable or shown to be known false, and not prejudicial (affirmed) |
| Reference to non‑testifying co‑conspirator’s guilty plea | Prosecutor’s elicitation of Jones’ guilty plea improperly admitted substantive evidence of Sitzmann’s guilt | Government conceded the elicitation was erroneous but argued lack of prejudice given strong case | Held: Error was plain and serious but not prejudicial under plain‑error review given the weight of evidence; no reversal (affirmed) |
| Ineffective assistance of counsel (raised on appeal) | Trial counsel made multiple errors (failed objections, stipulations, evidentiary concessions, venue positions) that were prejudicial | Claims are conclusory or refuted by the record; not colorable and do not require remand; overwhelming evidence also forecloses prejudice | Held: Court declined to remand; claims were insubstantial or disproven by trial record — no ineffective‑assistance relief (affirmed). (Separate concurrence would also bar some claims as unpreserved; dissent would remand.) |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution must disclose materially favorable evidence)
- Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (prosecutor may not present or permit false testimony to stand)
- Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (Giglio extends Brady to impeachment evidence of promises/agreements with witnesses)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for sufficiency of evidence review — view evidence in light most favorable to prosecution)
- Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010) (two‑step extraterritoriality framework)
- United States v. Spriggs, 102 F.3d 1245 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (discussing manufactured‑venue concept and when law enforcement tactics may be reproachable)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- United States v. Haire, 371 F.3d 833 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (criteria when venue is a jury question)
- United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) (plain‑error review framework)
- Dominguez Benitez v. United States, 542 U.S. 74 (2004) (standard for assessing probability of different result under plain‑error review)
- Molina‑Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338 (2016) (assessing likelihood of different outcome under plain‑error analysis)
- United States v. McGill, 815 F.3d 846 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (limitations on introducing co‑defendant’s plea and when to remand ineffective‑assistance claims)
- United States v. Straker, 800 F.3d 570 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Napue/Brady analysis and harmlessness inquiry)