United States v. Gregg Stein
712 F.3d 1038
7th Cir.2013Background
- Stein pled guilty to Wisconsin misdemeanor battery (domestic violence) in 2008; plea dismissed an accompanying domestic-violence surcharge.
- Stein’s attorney advised that the plea without the surcharge might not trigger federal § 922(g)(9) firearm prohibition, affecting Stein’s gun rights.
- Stein received two years of probation with a no-guns condition; later information showed the attorney’s advice was erroneous.
- State judge acknowledged Hayes-like reasoning that the predicate state offense need not denominate a domestic relationship to meet § 922(g)(9).
- After probation, Stein learned he was federally prohibited and completed ATF Form 4473; he admitted prior firearm possession and transferred guns to his mother’s house.
- Stein was charged under § 922(g)(9); he attempted to introduce evidence that he lacked knowledge of his prohibited status to negate mens rea; the district court deemed this evidence irrelevant.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does 'knowingly' in § 922(g)(9) require knowledge of prohibited status? | Stein argues § 922(g)(9) requires knowledge of status (dissent in Carlton Wilson). | Stein argues knowledge of facts suffices under Wilson precedents; knowledge of status not required. | No; knowledge of facts suffices under § 924(a)(2) interpretation and precedents. |
| Was evidence of knowledge of prohibited status properly deemed irrelevant? | Stein contends such evidence is legally relevant to mens rea. | District court correctly found it irrelevant per controlling authority. | Yes; the district court correctly excluded the evidence. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Carlton Wilson, 159 F.3d 280 (7th Cir. 1998) (knowledge of facts, not knowledge of illegality, governs § 922(g)(9))
- United States v. Lee Wilson, 437 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2006) (knowledge of the facts constituting the offense suffices for § 922(g)(1))
- Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184 (U.S. 1998) (knowingly requires knowledge of the elements of the offense)
- United States v. Shelton, 325 F.3d 553 (5th Cir. 2003) (no principled distinction between § 922(g)(8) and § 922(g)(9))
- United States v. Hancock, 231 F.3d 557 (9th Cir. 2000) (knowledge of facts approach to § 922(g) prosecutions)
- United States v. Hutzell, 217 F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 2000) (same knowledge-of-facts standard for § 922(g))
- United States v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 2000) (knowledge of facts suffices for § 922(g))
- United States v. Beavers, 206 F.3d 706 (6th Cir. 2000) (knowledge standard for § 922(g))