United States v. Gibbs, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 17981

Gibbs was convicted in Delaware of wearing body armor during the commission of a felony (possession with intent to deliver cocaine) under 11 Del. C. § 1449(a).
The underlying felony in the body-armor count was possession with intent to distribute cocaine, classified as a serious drug offense for ACCA purposes if it meets the statutory criteria.
The government previously counted Gibbs' 2003 aggravated menacing and 2004 cocaine-distribution convictions as ACCA predicates; the 2007 body-armor conviction was contested.
The government later contended that the body-armor conviction qualified as a serious drug offense because the underlying felony was drug-related, triggering ACCA enhancement.
The district court held Gibbs’ Delaware body-armor conviction did not qualify as a serious drug offense under ACCA § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) and declined to apply the enhancement.
The Third Circuit vacated the district court’s ruling and remanded for sentencing, holding the body-armor conviction can be a predicate under ACCA after applying the modified categorical approach to examine the underlying indictment/plea facts.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is Gibbs’ Delaware body-armor conviction a predicate offense under ACCA § 924(e)?	Gibbs argues it is not; the underlying felony is not clearly a drug offense.	Gibbs’ body-armor conviction is tied to possession with intent to deliver cocaine, a drug offense.	Yes; it qualifies as a serious drug offense under ACCA.
Should the court use the modified categorical approach to evaluate whether the body-armor conviction qualifies?	Formal categorical approach should apply, focusing only on the statute and conviction.	Modified categorical approach is appropriate because the statute is disjunctive and the underlying facts matter.	Modified categorical approach applies.
Does the underlying indictment show that the body-armor offense related to manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to distribute a controlled substance?	The indictment shows underlying drug felony; body-armor is connected to that.	The conviction hinges on the body-armor statute, not necessarily on the drug crime.	Yes; the underlying drug offense is inherent to the conduct.

Taylor v. United States, 560 U.S. 575? (1990) (framework for categorical vs. modified categorical approach (note: actual citation provided in opinion is Taylor, 495 U.S. 575))
Garcia v. Attorney General, 462 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2006) (categorical vs. modified categorical analysis in ACCA context)
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (allowing look to charging documents/records under modified categorical approach)
United States v. Brandon, 247 F.3d 186 (4th Cir. 2001) (modified categorical approach in evaluating state drug offenses)
United States v. Vickers, 540 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2008) (broad interpretation of ‘involving’ to include related offenses)
United States v. McKenney, 450 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2006) (limits of ‘involving’ and need to avoid too remote or tangential connections)