Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge TRAXLER wrote the opinion, in which Judge WILLIAMS and Judge LEE joined.
OPINION
Durham police officers investigating complaints of drug activity saw Michael Leon Brandon and another individual smoking crack cocaine. Brandon, carrying a black bag and a crack pipe, walked away from the scene despite the officers’ requests to the contrary. Brandon then ran, shedding many of his clothes and the black bag along the way. After several blocks, the officers apprehended Brandon and then located the black bag, which contained a stolen .45 caliber semi-automatic pistol. Brandon, a convicted felon, pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(1) (West 2000). The district court determined that Brandon was an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e)(1) (West 2000) and sentenced him to 180 months, the minimum sentence under that section. Brandon appeals, challenging the en *188 hanced sentence. We vacate Brandon’s sentence and remand for resentencing.
I.
Federal law prohibits the possession of a firearm by certain people, including those “who ha[ve] been convicted in any court of[ ] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(1) (West 2000). While the sentence for a section 922(g) violation ordinarily is not mоre than ten years, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(a)(2) (West 2000), section 924(e) imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years for a violation of section 922(g) if the defendant has three previous convictions “for a violent felony or a serious drug offense,” 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e)(1). As is relevant to this case, the statute defines a “serious drug offense” as “an offense under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance ... for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii).
Brandon has three prior drug-related convictions. He concedes that two of the convictions satisfy section 924's definition of a sеrious drug offense, but he contends that the third conviction does not. The challenged conviction (the "1994 conviction") is Brandon's 1994 guilty plea in North Carolina to a charge of possessing between twenty-eight and two hundred grams of cocaine in violation of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 90-95(h)(3). Under this statute, "[amy person who sells, manufactures, delivers, transports, or possesses 28 grams or more of cocaine shall be guilty of a felony .. known as `trafficking in cocaine.'" The statute establishes three levels of progressively severe sentences for cases involving at least twenty-eight but less than two hundred grams; at least two hundred but less than four hundred grams; and more than four hundred grams. Brandon argues that because he was charged with and pleaded guilty only to possession of cocaine, the 1994 conviction is not a serious drug offense as defined in section 924(e). If Brandon’s position is correct, then he would not be subject to the mandatory fifteen year minimum sentence required by section 924(e). Whether the 1994 conviction qualifies as a predicate conviction under section 924(e) is a question of statutory interpretation reviewed
de novo. See United States v. Letterlough,
II.
When determining whether a prior conviction can support enhanced sentencing under section 924(e), courts use a “categorical approach, looking only to the statutory definitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts underlying those convictions.”
Taylor v. United States,
This narrow exception applies in cases where the state statute can be violated in several ways, some of which would support enhancement under 924(e) and some of which would not. In those cases, the sentencing court may examine the indictment, other charging pаpers, or jury instructions to determine whether the defendant was charged with a crime that meets the requirements of section 924(e).
See id.; see also United States v. Coleman,
In this case, Brandon’s 1994 conviction springs from a violátion of a statute that prohibits the sale, manufacture, delivery, transportation, or possession of twenty-eight grams or more of cocaine. Because the statute can be violated by conduct that clearly falls within section 924(e)(A)(2)(ii)’s definition of serious drug felony (sale or manufacture), as well as by conduct that perhaps does not fall within the definition (possession), then resort to the indictment is proper.
See United States v. Whitfield,
The indictment underlying the 1994 conviction alleges only that Brandon possessed more than twenty-eight grams but less than two hundred grams of cocaine. As previously noted, section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) defines a serious drug offense as an offense under state law that involves “manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance.” Thus, it would appear that Brandon’s 1994 conviction, which seems to involve only possession, not possession with intent to distribute, does not satisfy thе requirements for sentence enhancement under section 924(e).
The government, however, contends that while section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) requires a predicate conviction to “involve[ ] possession] with intent to manufacture or distribute,” that does not mean the required intent must be an element of the underlying crime. According to the government, because “serious drug offense” is not defined by reference to the elements of the crime, Congress did not require intent to manufacture or distribute to be an element of the underlying crime. The government argues that all North Carolina convictions for trafficking by possession “involve” intent to distribute given the quantity (at least twenty-eight grams оf cocaine) required to trigger application of the statute.
As the government points out, Congress defined “violent felony” in section 924(e) as a crime that
“has as an element
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another,” 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e)(2)(B)© (emphasis added), and also as a crime that
“otherwise involves
conduct that presents a serious potential risk physical injury to another,” 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added). When applying this subsection, courts routinely give different meaning to the phrases “has as an element” and “otherwise involves,” treating
*190
as violent felonies convictions under statutes proscribing conduct that presents a substаntial risk of injury, even though force or physical injury is not an element of the underlying crime.
See, e.g., United States v. Stephens,
Section 924(e)’s definition of serious drug offense speaks not in terms of the elements of the underlying crimes, but in terms of crimes
“involving
manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute” illegal drugs. 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). We see nothing in the structure or wording of subsection (2)(A)(ii) that would permit us to interpret “involving” in a manner inconsistent with the interpretation of “otherwise involves” in subsection (2)(B)(ii). That is, we cannot read “otherwise involves” as having a meaning distinct from “has as an element,” while at the same time reading “involving” as meaning “has as an element.”
See Commissioner v. Lundy,
Moreover, the word “involving” itself suggests that the subsection should be read expansively,
see, e.g., American Heritage College Dictionary
717 (3d ed. 1997) (defining “involve” as “[t]o have as a necessary feature or consequence” (emphasis added)), as evidenced by this court’s decision in
United States v. James,
[V]iolations “involving” the distribution, manufacture, or importation of controlled substances must be read as including more than merely the crimes of distribution, manufacturing, and importation themselves. Possession with intent to distribute is closely and necessarily involved with distribution. In fact, the linе between the two may depend on mere fortuities, such as whether police intervene before or after narcotics have actually changed hands.
Id. at 93.
Accordingly, we agree with the government that a prior conviction constitutes a serious drug felony if the underlying crime involves possession with intent to manufacture or distribute, even if that intent is not a formal element of the crime under state law. 2 It does not follow from *191 this conclusion, however, that Brandon’s 1994 conviction is a serious drug offense for purposes of section 924(e).
In cases where enhancement under section 924(e) is hinged not on the elements of the underlying crime but on whether the crime “involves” partiсular conduct, courts follow the approach outlined in
Taylor
and ask whether the proscribed conduct is an inherent part or result of the generic crime of conviction, without regard to the facts surrounding the underlying conviction, or, stated somewhat differently, whether the abstract crime intrinsically involves the proscribed conduct.
See Stephens,
Distribution of drugs is a greater threat to sociеty than is mere use of the drugs, though both constitute great dangers, and it is natural and reasonable to assume that those who possess very large quantities of drugs intend to distribute those drugs. And this very reasonable assumption is likely the reason that many states have enacted trafficking statutes that severely punish possession of large quantities of drugs without making intent to distribute those drugs an element of the crime. What quantity of drugs must be possessed before this presumption of an intent to distribute is appropriate, however, is difficult to answer definitively, as evidenced by the widely varying quantities that states have established as the threshold for a trafficking-by-possession conviction. For example, possession of five grams of cocaine is considered trafficking in Delaware, see DeLCode Ann. tit. 16, § 4753A(a)(2); possession of ten grams of cocaine is trafficking in South Carolina, see S.C.Code Ann. § 44 — 53—3T0(e) (2); possession of twenty-eight grams is trafficking in North Carolina, see N.C. GemStat. § 90 — 95(h)(3); but it takes possession of more than one hundred and fifty grams to be guilty of trafficking in Missouri, see Mo. Ann. Stat. § 195.223.2.
Most people might agree that intent to distribute is inherent in the possession of two hundred grams of cocaine, but Brandon was alleged to have been in possession of between twenty-eight grams (which is just under an ounce) and two hundred grams of cocaine. Quantities at the lower end of this range are not so largе that the only reasonable inference is that one who possesses that amount must intend to distribute it. While that may be a reasonable inference, another reasonable inference is that an ounce of cocaine, or even more, is intended for personal use only.
Cf United States v. Baker,
If Brandon had been convicted under a statute with a sufficiently high minimum quantity — for example, a statute like Missouri’s that considers possession of more than one hundred and fifty grams of cocaine to be trafficking — then we would have no difficulty concluding that the conviction “involved” an intent to manufacture or distribute. That is, under such a statute we could easily conclude from the statutory definition (possession of more than
*193
one hundred and fifty grams of cocаine) that intent to manufacture or distribute is inherent in the crime of conviction. Given the range of drug quantities covered by the North Carolina statute, however, we simply cannot say that the typical conduct reached by that statute inherently involves an intent to manufacture or distribute that cocaine, which would be necessary for the 1994 conviction to serve as a predicate conviction under section 924(e)(A)(2)(ii).
Cf. United States v. Martin,
Preliminarily, we question whether such a factual inquiry is consistent with the categorical approach used when determining whether a prior conviction is a predicate conviction under section 924(e).
See Taylor,
The indictment for the 1994 conviction states only that Brandon possessed between twenty-eight and two hundred grams; it does not mention the specific quantity involved. The amount, however, is mentioned in the presentence report, and Brandon does not challenge that amount as inaccurate. Whether it is proper under
Taylor
to look to facts contained in a presentence report when the fact of conviction is insufficient to resolve the armed career criminal question is open to some debate.
Compare, e.g., United States v. Adams,
As will be explained in more detail later, the Supreme Court in
Taylor
determined that “burglary” as used in section 924(e) referred to a generic burglary, with certain elements specified by the Court, and not simply to any crime that happened to be called burglary under state law.
See
*194
Taylor,
Taylor
thus allows consideration of information other than the fact of conviction only for the purpose of determining what facts the jury was required to find to convict the defendant. In effect, then, this inquiry simply determines the elements of the particular permutation of a crime with which the defendant was charged when the statute defines a crime that can be committed in several ways; it does not allow consideration of the defendant’s particular conduct if that conduct does not help determine the elements of the crime with which the defendant was actually charged.
See United States v. Watkins,
Moreover, while there is no dispute here as to the quantity involvеd in the 1994 conviction, that may not always be the case. In cases where the underlying conviction is the result of a trial with hotly contested evidence, determination of the quantity involved might well be difficult, if not impossible, without resort to the mini-trials the Supreme Court frowned upon in
Taylor. See Taylor,
Nonetheless, even if inquiry into the amount actually possessed by Brandon were proper, our conclusion that the 1994 conviction is not a predicate conviction under section 924(e) would not change. The record reveals that Brandon’s 1994 conviction involved possession of thirty-five grams, or approximately one and a quarter ounces, of cocaine. If it is proper under section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) to conclude from the quantity of drugs actually possessed by the defendant that a prior conviction involves possession with intent to distribute, then *195 the quantity at issue here, a relatively small amount that could reasonably be intended only for personal use, is insufficient to support that conclusion. 4
The government, however, suggests that we can infer the requisite intent from North Carolina’s designation of Brandon’s crime as “trafficking.” According to the government, trafficking as it is commonly used refers to regular buying and selling. Thus, the government argues that the North Carolina legislature, by defining Brandon’s possession offense as trafficking, has decided that anyone who possesses at least twenty-eight grams of cocaine intends to distribute the cocaine.
See State v. Pipkins,
We believe it is аn oversimplification to say that all trafficking offenses in North Carolina involve an intent to distribute. While the North Carolina legislature may well have concluded that one who possesses more than twenty-eight grams of cocaine likely intends to distribute it, the statute by its terms applies to those who do not intend to distribute as long as they possess the requisite quantity. In fact, the presence of an intent to distribute can be considered an aggravating factor justifying an increase in the sentence imposed for a trafficking conviction.
See State v. Perry,
Moreover, even if we were to accept the government’s contention that the word “trafficking” as it is commonly used
*196
and as it is in fact used in the North Carolina statute encompasses an intent to distribute, the government’s argument would still fail. In
Taylor,
the Supreme Court was faced with the question of what crimes should be considered burglary under section 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), which defines “violent felony” for purposes of sentencing enhancement to include “burglary, arson, or extortion, or [other crime that] otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physicаl injury to another.” The Court rejected the view that “burglary” as used in section 924 means any crime denominated as burglary under state law. The Court noted that the states define burglary in widely different ways — for example, burglary includes shoplifting in California and theft from a coin-operated vending machine in Texas.
See Taylor,
It seems to us to be implausible that Congress intended the meaning of “burglary” for purposes of § 924(e) to depend on the definition adopted by the State of conviction. That would mean that a person convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm would, or would not, receive a sentence enhancement based on exactly the same conduct, depending on whether the State of his prior conviction happened to call that conduct “burglary.”
Id.
at 590-91,
The Court determined that “ ‘burglary’ in § 924(e) must have some uniform definition independent of the labels employed by the various States’ criminal codes.”
Id.
at 592,
Taylor
thus requires us to reject the government’s argument that Brandon’s conviction must have involved possession with intent to distribute simply because the North Carolina legislature has labeled his crime “trafficking.” As noted above, states have widely varying definitions of trafficking. To accept the government’s argument would mean that defendants with prior convictions for possessing the same quantity of cocaine would or would not be subject to sentencing as armed career criminals depending on the state where the underlying conviction occurred, and thus would create the very inconsistencies in punishment that the Supreme Court in
Taylor
found impermissible.
See Taylor,
III.
To summarize, we conclude that “intent to manufacture or distribute” need not be an element of the crime underlying a state conviction for that conviction to bе considered a serious drug offense for purposes of sentence enhancement under section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). Nonetheless, because we cannot say that intent to manufacture or distribute is inherent in the generic conduct prohibited by the statute and alleged *197 in the indictment at issue in this case (possession of between twenty-eight and two hundred grams of cocaine), Brandon’s 1994 conviction is not a conviction for a serious drug offense under section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). And without the 1994 conviction, Brandon’s criminal history does not qualify him as an armed career criminal under section 924(e). We therefore vacate Brandon’s sentence and remand for resеntencing.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
Notes
. Although
Taylor
involved the determination of whether a prior conviction should be considered a burglary conviction under section 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), we have applied its categorical approach and its approval of limited review of the charging papers and jury instructions to cases involving other crimes under subsections (2)(B)(i) and (2)(B)(ii).
See United States v. Frazier-El,
. We recognize that there are decisions from other circuits that might appear to reach a different conclusion. But those cases in fact do not address the precise issue we confront here. For example, in
United States v. Whitfield,
. The same categorical approach is applied when determining whether an underlying conviction is a “crime of violence” for purposes of career offender status under section 4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines Manual. Courts often rely on guidelines cases when considering armed career criminal status under section 924(e) and vice versa.
See Martin,
. Because it cannot be inferred from the quantity possessed by Brandon that the 1994 conviction involved an intent to manufacture or distribute, we do not decide whether the quantity of drugs actually possessed by a defendant can be considered when determining whether a conviction under a statute like the one at issue here, which prohibits possession of certain ranges of drug quantities, is a conviction for a serious drug offense under section 924(e)(2)(A). Of course, if the statutory quantity range were sufficient to support a determination that the conviction involved the requisite intent, then there would be no need to inquire into the actual amount possessed by the defendant.