United States v. Genaro Mayorga-Salazar
670 F. App'x 847
| 5th Cir. | 2016Background
- Defendant Genaro Mayorga-Salazar was convicted of being an alien unlawfully present in the U.S. after a prior deportation.
- The district court applied an eight-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) based on a prior Texas conviction for evading arrest with a motor vehicle, treating it as an aggravated felony.
- Mayorga-Salazar challenged the enhancement, arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (incorporated into the aggravated-felony definition) is facially unconstitutionally vague in light of Johnson v. United States and therefore cannot support classification of his prior conviction as a crime of violence.
- He also raised an as-applied vagueness challenge specific to the Texas evading-arrest offense.
- The Government moved for summary affirmance; the panel considered whether summary disposition was appropriate given circuit precedent.
- The court concluded § 16(b) could be straightforwardly applied to Mayorga-Salazar’s prior conviction and affirmed the district court’s judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 16(b) is facially unconstitutionally vague so it cannot define a crime of violence for § 1101(a)(43)(F) | § 16(b) is void under Johnson and thus cannot support classifying prior Texas conviction as a crime of violence | Government: Circuit precedent forecloses facial vagueness challenge; § 16(b) remains operative | Rejected — Gonzalez-Longoria forecloses facial vagueness; no relief granted |
| Whether § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Mayorga-Salazar’s Texas evading-arrest with a vehicle conviction | The statute is vague as applied to this offense and cannot be straightforwardly applied | Government: § 16(b) can be applied to the Texas offense; it qualifies as a crime of violence | Rejected — § 16(b) can be straightforwardly applied and the conviction is an aggravated felony under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) |
| Whether summary affirmance is appropriate | Mayorga-Salazar impliedly argued issues not foreclosed so summary affirmance should be denied | Government moved for summary affirmance arguing outcome is foreclosed by precedent | Court denied summary affirmance but affirmed judgment on merits without further briefing |
Key Cases Cited
- Groendyke Transport, Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1969) (standard for summary affirmance)
- United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 670 (5th Cir. en banc 2016) (applied § 16(b) and addressed as-applied vagueness challenges)
- United States v. Lopez, [citation="461 F. App'x 372"] (5th Cir. 2012) (summary affirmance reserved for issues foreclosed by circuit precedent)
- United States v. Houston, 625 F.3d 871 (5th Cir. 2010) (noting denial of summary affirmance where issue not foreclosed)
- United States v. Sanchez-Ledezma, 630 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 2011) (application of § 16(b) in similar contexts)
- Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2006) (unpublished opinions as persuasive authority)
- Wicker v. McCotter, 798 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1986) (panel bound by circuit precedent until Supreme Court decision)