United States v. Fredis Reyes-Contreras
882 F.3d 113
5th Cir.2018Background
- Reyes-Contreras, a Honduran national, pleaded guilty to illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 after prior deportation; PSR applied a 16-level Guidelines enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) based on a 2006 Missouri voluntary manslaughter conviction.
- Missouri conviction record: indictment for second-degree murder alleging he struck the victim with a baseball bat; plea judgment simply states "voluntary manslaughter" (no subsection specified or factual elaboration).
- Missouri manslaughter statute contains two alternatives: (1) killing under sudden passion from adequate cause (subsection (1)) and (2) knowingly assisting another in self-murder (subsection (2)).
- The government argued the manslaughter conviction supported the COV enhancement; Reyes-Contreras argued the statute is indivisible/overbroad or, at minimum, the conviction documents do not show which subsection was convicted.
- The Fifth Circuit found the statute divisible (allowing the modified categorical approach) but the conviction documents did not specify the subsection of conviction, so the court vacated and remanded for resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Missouri's voluntary manslaughter statute is divisible for the modified categorical approach | Reyes-Contreras: statute is indivisible; alternatives are means, not elements, so cannot be narrowed | Government: statute can be read to encompass discrete offenses, enabling subdivision selection | Court: statute is divisible; state statutory scheme and caselaw treat subsections as distinct offenses |
| Whether the conviction documents identify which subsection supported the guilty plea | Reyes-Contreras: plea/judgment silent as to subsection so enhancement cannot rely on subsection (1) | Government: indictment and judgment language ("first degree") indicate subsection (1) | Court: neither indictment nor plea unambiguously identifies subsection; cannot use indictment to narrow when plea does not reference a lesser-included offense; must treat record as ambiguous |
| Whether subsection (2) (assisting suicide) qualifies as a "crime of violence" or has "use of force" as an element | Reyes-Contreras: subsection (2) need not involve force; thus it is not a COV | Government: subsection (2) should be considered generic or otherwise satisfy use-of-force requirement | Court: subsection (2) does not require use of force and is not generically murder; thus it does not qualify as a COV |
| Whether armed criminal action conviction independently supports the COV enhancement | Government: armed criminal action involves dangerous instrument/deadly weapon and therefore satisfies use of force | Reyes-Contreras: statute criminalizes possession/aid without actual use or threatened force | Court: Missouri armed criminal action can be satisfied by possession/assistance that does not include threatened or used force, so it overbroadly criminalizes non-violent conduct and cannot reliably support the enhancement |
Key Cases Cited
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (distinguishes elements from means and explains divisibility/modified categorical approach)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (limits documents courts may consult under the modified categorical approach)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (explains when a statute is indivisible and facts cannot be used to narrow the offense)
- Castleman v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) (interprets "use of physical force" in domestic-violence context and discusses direct vs. indirect force)
- United States v. Rico-Mejia, 859 F.3d 318 (5th Cir. 2017) (held Castleman does not alter Fifth Circuit’s precedent on required degree/directness of force for COV)
- United States v. Bonilla, 524 F.3d 647 (5th Cir. 2008) (defines generic manslaughter and discusses use of modified categorical materials)
- United States v. Calderon-Pena, 383 F.3d 254 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (holding offenses that can be committed without bodily contact do not qualify as crimes of violence)
- United States v. Velasco, 465 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2006) (explains that armed criminal action requires more than mere possession to satisfy "use" of force)
- United States v. Martinez-Romero, 817 F.3d 917 (5th Cir. 2016) (describes harmless-error standard when sentencing adjustments are dependent on erroneous Guidelines calculations)