United States v. Fr'neil Hickson, 708 F. App'x 78

Fr’Neil Hickson appealed interlocutorily after the District Court (D.N.J.) denied his motion to dismiss charges: unlicensed dealing in firearms (18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A)), conspiracy to deal firearms (18 U.S.C. § 371), and felon-in-possession (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)).
Hickson previously pled guilty in the Northern District of Georgia to one count of felon in possession (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)) for a separate April 29, 2014 firearms purchase and was sentenced in March 2016.
The New Jersey indictment (June 15, 2016) alleges a gun-trafficking conspiracy involving different guns, dates (through April 2013), and locations; it also names Joshua Jackson as a co-conspirator and alleges a network supplying guns.
Hickson argued double jeopardy: the Georgia prosecution prosecuted part of the same alleged conspiracy, and the Georgia transaction involved an ATF informant (Sylvia Jackson) connected to the New Jersey investigation.
The Third Circuit applied the Blockburger “same-elements” test and treated the Georgia felon-in-possession conviction as arising from a distinct possession incident separate from the conduct charged in New Jersey.
Court concluded Counts One (unlicensed dealing) and Two (conspiracy) require elements not needed for the Georgia § 922(g)(1) offense; Count Three (felon-in-possession) involved a distinct act of possession and therefore does not violate double jeopardy.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether double jeopardy bars prosecution in D.N.J. because Georgia prosecution covered same conspiracy	Georgia prosecution prosecuted a piece of the same conspiracy; thus D.N.J. charges improperly split a single conspiracy	Counts in New Jersey require different elements and allege distinct acts/dates/guns; prosecutions are separate	Denied—no double jeopardy: offenses distinct under Blockburger
Whether Count One (unlicensed dealing) is precluded by § 922(g)(1) conviction	The earlier conviction covers the conduct alleged in Count One	§ 922(a)(1)(A) requires proof of being an unlicensed dealer; § 922(g)(1) requires status as a felon—different elements	Count One is not barred; different statutory elements
Whether Count Two (conspiracy) is precluded by the guilty plea	The § 922(g)(1) conviction encompassed conspiratorial conduct	Conspiracy requires agreement with others and an overt act—elements not required by § 922(g)(1)	Count Two is not barred; conspiracy is a distinct offense
Whether Count Three (felon-in-possession) is barred because it arose from the same factual episode	The Georgia possession was part of the larger alleged conspiracy and thus reprosecution amounts to double jeopardy	Georgia possession was a separate incident (different date, guns, jurisdiction); distinct act of possession	Count Three is not barred; separate possession incident precludes double jeopardy

Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49 (double jeopardy principle against splitting a conspiracy into multiple prosecutions)
United States v. Becker, 892 F.2d 265 (3d Cir.) (application of conspiracy-splitting principle)
United States v. Xavier, 2 F.3d 1281 (3d Cir.) (Blockburger same-elements standard cited)
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (establishes same-elements test for double jeopardy)
United States v. Dodd, 225 F.3d 340 (3d Cir.) (elements of § 922(g)(1) felon-in-possession)
United States v. Tann, 577 F.3d 533 (3d Cir.) (distinct incidents of possession can stand apart for § 922(g)(1) analysis)
United States v. Liotard, 817 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir.) (totality/overlap considerations in conspiracy prosecutions)