United States v. Ferguson
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14135
| 7th Cir. | 2016Background
- In April 2015, 17‑year‑old Grover Ferguson carjacked a woman, shot her three times at point‑blank range (including to the face), causing permanent loss of sight in one eye, chronic pain, and psychological trauma.
- Ferguson pled guilty to vehicular robbery by force (18 U.S.C. § 2119(2)) and discharging a firearm in relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii)).
- Guideline calculations produced a combined range of 198–217 months (including a mandatory consecutive 120 months on the § 924(c) count); the government requested 240 months; defense sought 180 months.
- The district court imposed a 600‑month (50‑year) sentence (8 years for carjacking, 42 years consecutive for the firearm count) — over 31 years above the guideline high end.
- The district court initially failed to announce supervised‑release conditions at sentencing and entered an amended judgment adding those conditions months later; the appeal was filed after the oral sentence but before the amended judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Government's Argument | Ferguson's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adequacy of explanation for a major variance from the Guidelines | The crime’s extreme violence justified an above‑guideline (but substantially less than 50 years) sentence to protect the public and deter similar conduct. | The sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to provide a sufficient explanation for a variance of more than 31 years above the guideline range. | Vacated and remanded: such a dramatic variance requires a more substantial, specific justification to permit meaningful appellate review. |
| Timing and omission of supervised‑release conditions | Court could later supply conditions; sentencing was otherwise final for jurisdictional purposes. | District court erred by not imposing supervised‑release conditions at sentencing or in the original written judgment. | The court erred in delaying imposition of supervised‑release conditions; conditions are part of the sentence and should be announced at sentencing (but remand was ordered on broader grounds). |
| Appellate jurisdiction despite amended judgment filed after notice of appeal | The original judgment that ordered imprisonment was a final judgment for appeal purposes. | Not argued to deprive appellate jurisdiction. | Appellate jurisdiction is not defeated by the later amended judgment; the original imprisonment judgment was final. |
| Relevance of judge’s extraneous remarks at sentencing | Remarks reflected context for judge’s view of seriousness and deterrence. | Comments about Moynihan Report, Tet, and personal anecdotes were irrelevant and risked injecting improper considerations. | Remarks were concerning but not so tainted as to require remand on that ground alone; court cautioned judges to avoid such irrelevant references. |
Key Cases Cited
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (major departures require more significant justification; explanation must permit meaningful appellate review)
- United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (Sentencing Guidelines are advisory post‑Booker)
- Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530 (2013) (Guidelines provide an important benchmark; appellate review must be meaningful)
- Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) (district courts may disagree with Guidelines’ policy judgments)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (noting heightened Eighth Amendment concerns for severe juvenile sentences)
- Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605 (2010) (judgment that orders imprisonment is a final judgment)
- United States v. Castaldi, 743 F.3d 589 (7th Cir. 2014) (upholding substantial but smaller above‑guideline variance based on extraordinary victim harm)
- United States v. Neal, 810 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2016) (conditions of supervised release are part of the sentence)
- United States v. Robinson, 829 F.3d 878 (7th Cir. 2016) (remand required where irrelevant sentencing remarks may have influenced the sentence)
- United States v. Ray, 831 F.3d 431 (7th Cir. 2016) (procedures for modifying supervised‑release terms while an appeal is pending)
