UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Billy J. ROBINSON, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
No. 15-2019
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued January 20, 2016. Decided July 22, 2016
812 F.3d 878
Craig W. Albee, Attorney, Federal Defender Services of Eastern Wisconsin, Incorporated, Milwaukee, WI, for Defendant-Appellant
Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and MANION and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.
WOOD, Chief Judge.
Billy Robinson‘s guilty plea was routine; his sentencing hearing was not. Robinson pleaded guilty to two counts of traveling in interstate commerce to facilitate heroin distribution, in violation of
I
Robinson‘s cousin, Trivon Carter, led a heroin trafficking ring from 2012 to 2014. His organization bought heroin in Chicago and sold it in Milwaukee. For most of that two-year period, Carter relied on Kathryn Du Vergey to run drugs from one state to the other. But for two months in the spring of 2014, Carter brought Robinson into the operation. Robinson might have thought this was his lucky day, but he would have been wrong: that was just when law enforcement officers were closing in on Carter‘s scheme. Robinson fell into the trap when he sold heroin to a confidential informant. Shortly afterward, the police arrested him, along with Carter, Du Vergey, and other conspirators.
Robinson ultimately pleaded guilty in the Eastern District of Wisconsin to two counts of traveling in interstate commerce to facilitate heroin distribution. See
II
A district court that fails properly to explain its sentence by reference to the sentencing criteria set out in
In Robinson‘s case, before imposing sentence the district court engaged in several wide-ranging soliloquies on urban decay, the changing nature of Robinson‘s neighborhood, the “pathology” of certain neighborhoods, and the connection between Milwaukee‘s 1967 riots and recent protests in Baltimore, Maryland. Sentences in criminal cases must be based only on the criteria authorized by Congress. See
The sentencing hearing took a wrong turn by focusing on urban decay, social unrest, and the judge‘s personal experiences in the relevant neighborhood. As we have said before, “it is inappropriate to blame [a defendant] for issues of broad local, national, and international scope that only tangentially relate to his underlying conduct.” Smith, 400 Fed.Appx. at 99 (citing Figueroa, 622 F.3d at 743-44). We need not review all of the comments made during sentencing; a few examples will suffice.
The district judge invoked his own recollections from his college days of Robinson‘s neighborhood, noting that many years ago it was a safe place and now it was not, because of the omnipresent drug trade. These references are troubling because they could be “understood as a personal grudge that the judge bore against [Robinson] for dealing drugs in his old neighborhood.” United States v. Wilson, 383 Fed.Appx. 554, 557 (7th Cir. 2010) (nonprecedential). They appear to attribute “issues of broad local [and] national scope“—changing crime rates in cities—to Robinson‘s crime, when these issues at best “only tangentially relate to his underlying conduct.” Smith, 400 Fed.Appx. at 99. Robinson was not charged with a violent crime or a crime involving a firearm, nor did his criminal history include any such crimes.
The district judge also went too far when he suggested that Robinson‘s crime was related somehow to events elsewhere in the country. The court discussed its belief that Milwaukee today is similar to Milwaukee in 1967, and drew questionable—and irrelevant—parallels between Milwaukee‘s 1967 riots and recent protests in Baltimore over police brutality. He noted in particular some protests in Milwaukee over the Vietnam War in 1967 (12 years before Robinson was born)—protests that got in the way of his deployment to a combat zone. He wondered what would happen if something similar were to take place today, and he bemoaned the
Robinson was convicted of a drug-related crime. He was not charged with or convicted of any crime involving inciting a riot. Moreover, events in Milwaukee before he was born, or recent protests in other cities, are not relevant to Robinson‘s sentence. See Smith, 400 Fed.Appx. at 99. And it is hard to know what the judge meant by the “pathology” of the neighborhood. A reference to general deterrence or protection of the public would have been proper, see
The district court also used “colorful” language to “dispense with arguments that [it] did not appreciate.” See Figueroa, 622 F.3d at 743. In response to Robinson‘s statement that his family supports him, the court said, “I don‘t care how nice you are. How much your family loves you. I mean, my family loves me, too.” And in response to Robinson‘s statement that he and his fiancée intended to move to Alabama in order to leave behind negative influences in Wisconsin and Illinois, the court pointed out that Robinson had five children by four different different mothers, and questioned whether he was really prepared to support all five. Robinson‘s childcare arrangements might be relevant to his sentence for some purposes. The fact that he has children with multiple mothers is not, however, “the real problem” (in the judge‘s words) that his sentence is meant to address.
While “sentencing is an individual, and at times idiosyncratic, process,” this “does not excuse the court from its duty to ensure a fair process.” Figueroa, 622 F.3d at 743-44. Because the district court did not “adequately explain its chosen sentence” with reference to the relevant criteria laid out in
III
Robinson also argues that the court erred by failing to consider his theory that his lesser involvement in Carter‘s operation meant that he was entitled to receive a lesser sentence than Du Vergey. This point has no merit. The district court did consider Robinson‘s mitigation argument before rejecting it.
A district court must give proper consideration to nonfrivolous arguments for mitigation. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 357, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007). But the court “is not obliged to engage in a lengthy discussion of every argument for leniency that the defendant raises.” United States v. Patrick, 707 F.3d 815, 818 (7th Cir. 2013).
Here, the district court properly explained that it considered and rejected Robinson‘s argument. The court acknowledged Robinson‘s argument by stating “your attorney ... made that the argument that, you know, you‘re a bit player.”
IV
For these reasons, we VACATE Robinson‘s sentence and REMAND for resentencing. Circuit Rule 36 shall apply on remand.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Christopher EBERTS, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 15-2596
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued June 8, 2016
Decided July 22, 2016