United States v. Feauto, 146 F. Supp. 3d 1022

Background

Defendant Randy Feauto pleaded guilty to methamphetamine and firearms offenses and was subject to a statutory mandatory minimum of 240 months. At original sentencing the court granted the government's § 5K1.1/§ 3553(e) motion for substantial assistance and imposed 132 months.
The Sentencing Commission adopted Amendment 782 ("drugs minus two"), lowering drug offense base offense levels by two and made it retroactive; U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c) instructs how to apply retroactive amendments where a defendant previously received a substantial-assistance reduction, treating the amended guideline range without regard to § 5G1.1 (mandatory-minimum overrides).
On § 3582(c)(2) motion consideration, Feauto’s amended guideline range (post-Amendment 782) would be below his statutory mandatory minimum; application of § 1B1.10(c) could produce a lower resentencing starting point than the mandatory minimum and produce a larger net reduction than originally received.
The parties and amicus urged that § 1B1.10(c) allows resentencing below the statutory minimum where the government previously filed a substantial-assistance motion; the court invited briefing and issued a tentative opinion before final ruling.
The district court examined whether the Commission’s policy statement and its implementation of Amendment 782 exceed statutory authority or violate non-delegation/separation-of-powers principles, and whether statutes (§ 3553(e), § 3582(c)(2), § 994(u)) supply authorization.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Sentencing Commission may, via U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c) and Application Note 4 implementing Amendment 782, treat the amended guideline range as the starting point for a substantial-assistance reduction even if that range is below a statutory mandatory minimum	§ 1B1.10(c) is an "applicable policy statement" under § 3582(c)(2) and, when a prior substantial-assistance motion waived the bar, the Commission can direct resentencing from the amended guideline range	Such a construction nullifies statutory mandatory minimums, exceeds Commission authority, and conflicts with Congress’s exclusive power to set minimums; resentencing reductions below a mandatory minimum must be tied to § 3553(e) procedures	The court held the Commission lacks authority to nullify mandatory minimums on resentencing; § 1B1.10(c) cannot be applied to produce a resentencing below the statutory minimum in Feauto’s circumstances; Feauto denied relief
Whether § 3553(e) authorizes the Commission to implement § 1B1.10(c) so as to nullify mandatory minimums at resentencing	The sentence-authorizing phrase in § 3553(e) authorizes the Commission to issue related policy statements that can govern resentencing calculations	§ 3553(e) references guidelines/policy statements specifically related to substantial-assistance reductions (Chapter 5K) and does not delegate authority to nullify statutory minimums more broadly	Court held § 3553(e) does not supply authority for § 1B1.10(c) to nullify mandatory minimums on resentencing
Whether § 3582(c)(2) or § 994(u) supply statutory authority for the Commission’s policy	§ 3582(c)(2) permits reductions consistent with Commission policy statements; § 994(u) directs the Commission to specify retroactivity and reduction amounts	Neither statute expressly permits disregarding statutory mandatory minimums on resentencing; using them to do so would be an improper delegation and depart from statutory mandates	Court held neither § 3582(c)(2) nor § 994(u) authorizes nullifying mandatory minimums via § 1B1.10(c)
Whether the Commission’s policy would violate the non-delegation/separation-of-powers principles if Congress tacitly approved it	There is congressional intent/indifference and the Commission acted to reduce disparity and avoid circuit splits	Allowing the Commission to nullify statutory minimums would usurp Congress’s exclusive role in setting criminal minimums and fail the intelligible-principle test	Court held that, if such authority were delegated, it would violate non-delegation/separation-of-powers; therefore § 1B1.10(c) cannot be used to nullify mandatory minimums

Key Cases Cited

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (upholding constitutionality of the Sentencing Commission under intelligible-principle analysis)
Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (§ 3582(c)(2) relief is a narrow exception to finality)
Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522 (Sup. Ct. 2011) (discussing § 3582(c)(2) relief for defendants subject to excessive guideline ranges)
United States v. Anderson, 686 F.3d 585 (8th Cir. 2012) (describing § 3582(c)(2) as narrow exception)
United States v. Lawin, 779 F.3d 780 (8th Cir. 2015) (Amendment 782 reduced many drug base offense levels by two)
United States v. Thomas, 775 F.3d 982 (8th Cir. 2014) (Amendment 782 amended § 2D1.1 and did not alter other offense/offender based ranges)
United States v. Watts, 553 F.3d 603 (8th Cir. 2009) (district courts lack authority to reduce sentences below statutory minimums)
United States v. Chacon, 330 F.3d 1065 (8th Cir. 2003) (only § 3553(e) and § 3553(f) provide authority to depart below statutory minimums)
Key Medical Supply, Inc. v. Burwell, 764 F.3d 955 (8th Cir. 2014) (agency action ultra vires if it plainly violates an unambiguous statutory mandate)
United States v. Billue, 576 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2009) (substantial-assistance reductions below statutory minimums must be tied to assistance-related factors)