United States v. Dylan Marshall, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 23379

Background

Marshall pled guilty to receiving child pornography over a period when he was 18–20.
District court varied downward from guideline range and imposed the 5-year mandatory minimum sentence.
Marshall has Human Growth Hormone Deficiency, which he argues makes him analogous to a juvenile for Eighth Amendment purposes.
Evidence showed 261 images and 46 videos; files dated 2005–2010; online chat participation beginning in 2009.
District court found Marshall to be developmentally immature in key ways; judge believed he functioned like a juvenile despite chronological age.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentence, held Marshall was not a juvenile for Eighth Amendment purposes.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the mandatory minimum sentence violates the Eighth Amendment	Marshall argues he was a juvenile for purposes of Eighth Amendment protections.	The government contends chronological age controls and Marshall was an adult at the time of the offense.	No Eighth Amendment violation; Marshall not a juvenile; chronological age controls.
Whether growth hormone deficiency alters juvenile status for sentencing	Marshall contends GH deficiency makes him developmentally a juvenile and entitled to protections.	Court should rely on chronological age; physiology does not override age-based rules.	Physiological condition cannot override the chronological age line for Eighth Amendment analysis.
Whether the district court could consider developmental characteristics under 3553(a) given a mandatory minimum	District court should be allowed to tailor below-minimum sentence based on maturity.	Section 3553(a) cannot override mandatory minimums; minimums prevail.	Minimum sentence remains; 3553(a) does not permit below-minimum discretion here.
Whether charges and the parsimony provision impact the outcome	Prosecutorial charging decisions and the parsimony provision may impact fairness given unique characteristics.	Charging decisions are within prosecutorial discretion; parsimony provision does not allow bypassing mandatory minimums.	Charging decisions and parsimony provision do not justify avoiding the mandatory minimum.

Key Cases Cited

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (mandatory life-without-parole for juveniles; youth matters for severe penalties)
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (juveniles cannot be sentenced to life without parole for nonhomicide offenses)
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (death penalty for juveniles prohibited; chronological age as line)
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (proportionality in term-of-years sentences; not strict proportionality)
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (limits on proportionality; no strict proportionality required)
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (25-to-life for fifth felony; proportionality analysis guidance)
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (extreme disparity analysis for disproportionate sentences)
Graham v. United States (cited in context), not applicable (not applicable) (see above related juvenile cases)
Batchelder v. United States, 442 U.S. 114 (1979) (charging decisions and penalties; statutory ranges)
Armstrong v. United States, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (prosecutorial discretion in charging decisions)
Cecil v. United States, 615 F.3d 678 (2010) (parsimony provision cannot override mandatory minimums)
Odeneal v. United States, 517 F.3d 406 (2008) (separation of criminal provisions and discretion)
Dudeck v. United States, 657 F.3d 424 (2011) (equal treatment of receipt and possession statutes)
Ehle v. United States, 640 F.3d 689 (2011) (possession as lesser included offense of receipt)
Reingold v. United States, 731 F.3d 204 (2013) (comparing sentence severity across jurisdictions)