United States v. DUGAS, 5:03-cr-00029

Background

In 2003 a federal grand jury indicted Ernie Paul Dugas on three counts: kidnapping (Count 1), traveling in interstate commerce to engage in a sexual act with a minor (Count 2), and possession of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence (Count 3), the predicate for which was the kidnapping charged in Count 1.
Dugas pled guilty after trial testimony; the court sentenced him to concurrent terms of 235 and 180 months on Counts 1 and 2, and a consecutive 84 months on Count 3. He did not appeal.
After the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Davis (invalidating §924(c)’s residual clause), Dugas filed a counseled §2255 motion seeking to vacate Count 3; the Government agreed that relief was appropriate and waived procedural defenses.
The record did not clearly show whether the §924(c) conviction rested on the elements clause, the now-invalid residual clause, or both; under Eleventh Circuit law the movant bears the burden to prove the residual clause was the sole basis for conviction.
The court relied on Eleventh Circuit analogues and decisions from other circuits holding that federal kidnapping may be committed without physical force and therefore does not categorically qualify under §924(c)’s elements (force) clause.
Because kidnapping does not categorically satisfy the elements clause and the Government waived defenses, the court vacated Dugas’s §924(c) conviction and sentence on Count 3; all other judgments remain unchanged and no resentencing was ordered given Dugas’s existing life sentences.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Dugas)	Defendant's Argument (Government)	Held
Whether Dugas’s §924(c) conviction must be vacated post-Davis because the residual clause is invalid	Residual clause was the basis for the §924(c) conviction, so Davis entitles him to vacatur	Government concedes Davis applies and waives procedural defenses; agrees relief appropriate	Court granted vacatur of Count 3 because Davis invalidated the residual clause and Government agreed relief was proper
Whether federal kidnapping (§1201(a)) categorically qualifies as a “crime of violence” under §924(c)(3)(A) (the elements/force clause)	Kidnapping does not necessarily involve the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force and thus cannot serve as an elements-clause predicate	Government waived procedural/default defenses and acknowledged kidnapping does not qualify after Davis	Court concluded kidnapping is not a categorical crime of violence under the elements clause and vacated the §924(c) conviction

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (invalidating §924(c)’s residual clause)
Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 2017) (burden on movant to show residual clause was sole basis for conviction)
In re Hammoud, 931 F.3d 1032 (11th Cir. 2019) (Davis is retroactively applicable on collateral review)
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidating ACCA residual clause)
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (invalidating §16(b) residual clause)
United States v. Gillis, 938 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2019) (holding §1201(a) can be violated without physical force for force-clause purposes)
United States v. Walker, 934 F.3d 375 (4th Cir. 2019) (kidnapping does not categorically qualify under the force clause)
United States v. Brazier, 933 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2019) (reversing §924(c) convictions predicated on kidnapping)
Mays v. United States, 817 F.3d 728 (11th Cir. 2016) (standard for determining lawfulness of §924(c) convictions post-voiding of predicate)
Salemi v. United States, 26 F.3d 1084 (11th Cir. 1994) (discussing kidnapping as a violent crime under guideline definitions)