United States v. Donald Maclaren
866 F.3d 212
4th Cir.2017Background
- Donald Maclaren was certified under the Adam Walsh Act in 2009 and civilly committed in 2013 as a sexually dangerous person.
- The commitment finding rested on three statutory elements: prior sexually violent conduct/child molestation, a qualifying mental disorder, and likely serious difficulty refraining from reoffending if released.
- Maclaren filed a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 4247(h) (Oct. 2015) seeking a hearing to determine discharge or conditional release; an independent expert (Dr. Rosell) concluded Maclaren could be discharged.
- The government opposed, citing Maclaren’s refusal to participate in treatment and internal forensic reports concluding he remained sexually dangerous.
- The district court denied the § 4247(h) motion, adopting a heightened “particularity” showing (drawing on a prior decision, Barrett) that required detailed proof of changed psychological condition and steps toward meeting § 4248(d)(2) conditions.
- The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded, holding the district court applied the wrong standard and that a § 4247(h) motion need only plausibly allege entitlement to discharge (a Rule 12(b)(6)-style plausibility standard); factfinding and evidentiary burdens belong at the hearing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standard for evaluating a § 4247(h) motion to obtain a discharge hearing | A § 4247(h) motion need only plausibly allege entitlement to discharge; use plausibility pleading like Rule 12(b)(6). | Court should require detailed, particularized factual showing of changed condition and steps toward meeting release conditions (as in Barrett); alternatively, apply a summary-judgment-like standard. | Held: Use a plausibility-pleading standard. The motion must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a plausible claim for discharge; stricter evidentiary factfinding belongs at the hearing. |
| Role of § 4247(h) motion vs. discharge hearing | The motion is procedural to obtain a hearing; it should not require meeting the hearing’s evidentiary burdens. | The motion should show specific improvements/steps because courts have limited resources and to prevent frivolous hearings. | Held: The statute contemplates the hearing will carry the evidentiary burdens (preponderance at hearing); the motion’s purpose is to state a plausible basis for relief. |
| Proper use of procedural rules (Local Rules/Fed. R. Civ. P. 7) to deny hearings | Procedural rules do not convert into a substantive heightened standard for motions under § 4247(h). | Procedural compliance and particularity requirements justify denying unsupported motions. | Held: Court cannot graft Barrett’s particularity requirement into a substantive standard; procedural noncompliance can be addressed but not used to impose an improper substantive bar. |
| Burden on remand | Whether district court should reweigh evidence and deny without hearing | Government urged affirmance based on existing records showing no changed circumstances | Held: Remanded for the district court to apply the plausibility standard and determine whether the motion, accepted as true for well-pleaded facts, warrants a hearing; evidentiary disputes to be resolved at hearing. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Comstock, 627 F.3d 513 (4th Cir. 2010) (statutory elements for commitment under Adam Walsh Act)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility pleading standard)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading must be plausible on its face)
- SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., 801 F.3d 412 (4th Cir. 2015) (describing pleading standard principles)
- Ripley v. Foster Wheeler LLC, 841 F.3d 207 (4th Cir. 2016) (standard of review — de novo for legal questions)
- Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 848 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 2017) (interpretive canon—expressio unius commentary)